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ABSTRACT
Generally, extant turnaround research has been 
inductively based and has limited its conceptualization of 
strategy to strategy content. This study builds on past 
research by incorporating strategy process and 
theoretically deriving the causes of decline. In general 
terms, this study posits that fit (consistency) between 
strategy process and content is critical to an 
organization's ability to recover from poor performance. 
Specifically, the following are considered consistent 
responses: 1) an entrepreneurial strategy with 
decentralized decision making and expanded information 
usage; and, 2) an efficiency strategy with centralized 
decision making and constricted information usage. 
Additionally, organizations need to fit their strategy to 
the cause of decline to have superior turnaround 
performance.
This study examined the implications of strategy 
content/process fit and strategy/cause of decline fit in 
the hospital industry. Specifically, archival data for 
the years 1987-1994 was collected for the 131 Columbia/HCA 
hospitals identified as in decline during 1988-1991. 
Primary data was collected via questionnaire from 66 of 
these hospitals. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to 
assess the reliability, variance extracted, and 
discriminant validity of the measures collected by survey.
vi
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Moderated multiple regression failed to support the 
positive performance implications of either type of fit.
Potential explanations for the lack of support for 
the positive performance implications of fit were offered. 
These explanations include: l) the choice of strategy is 
not crucial to turnaround performance; 2) the two types of 
fit are necessary but not sufficient for enhanced 
performance; 3) turnaround processes are too idiosyncratic 
to generalize; and, 4) a conceptualization of fit other 
than the one posited in this study is more appropriate.
The limitations of this study include the number of 
respondents per organization, limited statistical power, 
limited generalizability of results, untested feedback 
loops, and potential retrospective and survival biases. 
This study concludes with suggestions for future research. 
These suggestions involve the role of the environment, 
organizational resources, and other strategy processes in 
organizational turnaround.
vii
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CHAPTER Is INTRODUCTION
The desire to understand, predict and control 
organizational performance guides much of strategy 
research (Summer et al., 1990). Indeed, strategy can be 
distinguished from other related disciplines by its 
emphasis on organizational performance (Meyer, 1991). 
Historically, strategy and other organizational sciences 
have focused on positive performance, such as 
organizational growth (Whetten, 1980a).
The topic of negative performance (i.e. , 
organizational decline) was ignored until the late 1970s 
(Meyer, 1988) . However, organizational decline has become 
a widespread phenomenon (O'Neill, 1994); accordingly, the 
quest to understand organizational decline and predict the 
efficacy of strategic responses has become more urgent 
(McKinley, 1993). Consistent with this pursuit, this 
study focuses on organizations that have experienced 
declining performance and their efforts to reverse the 
decline.
Before proceeding, it is instructive to delineate 
this study's place within the organizational decline 
research domain. Organizational decline results from a 
deterioration of an organization's adaptation to its 
environment and refers to decreasing internal resources 
over time (Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988). Although 
there is some research that overlaps among levels of
1
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analysis (e.g., Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981) or stages 
of decline (e.g., Whetten, 1980b), the organizational 
decline research domain can be classified along two 
dimensions: 1) focal unit of analysis
(industry/population, organization or individuals) ; and,
2) stage of decline (antecedents or responses). 
Illustrative references for this classification scheme are 
shown in Table 1-1.
The organizational decline research domain 
encompasses both antecedents and responses to 
organizational decline (Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988). 
Included in this domain are responses common, but not 
limited, to declining organizations (e.g., downsizing -- 
D'Aveni, 1989) . Responses to organizational decline can 
be further divided between descriptive responses (e.g., 
D'Aunno & Sutton, 1992; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981; 
Sutton & Callahan, 1987), and prescriptive responses 
(e.g., Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Hardy, 1987; Hofer,
19 80; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
Turnaround research fits in the firm-level 
prescriptive-response category that can be further divided 
into two types of research: 1) turnaround (e.g., Hambrick 
& Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; 
Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976); and, 2) downsizing (e.g., 
Cascio, 1993). Turnaround and downsizing research can be 
distinguished from each other in two ways. First,


















Illustrative References for Classification of 
Organizational Decline Research Domain
Industry/ Organization Individual
Population
Antecedents Environmental Organizational Individuals asof Antecedents: Antecedents: Antecedents:Decline Hannan & Freeman, Starbuck & Alexander,Fennell
1984; Zammuto & Hedberg, 1977; Sc Halpern, 1993;
Cameron, 1985 Whetten, 1980b Staw, 1976
Responses to Population Organizational IndividualDecline: Responses: Responses: Responses:Descriptive Carroll & DeWitt, 1993; Staw, SandelandsFocus Delacroix, 1982 D'Aveni, 1989; & Dutton, 1981;
Freeman & Sutton &
Cameron, 1993; Callahan, 1987;
Staw, Sandelands Brockner, Davey &
& Dutton, 1981 Carter, 1985
Responses to Industry Downsizing: Prescriptions forDecline: Prescriptions: Cascio, 1993; ManagingPrescriptive Harrigan, 19 80; Turnaround: Individuals:Focus Perry, 1986 Hambrick & Brockner, 1988;
Schecter, 1983; Hardy, 19 87;
Schendel, Patton Rice Sc
& Riggs, 1976 Dreilinger, 1991
turnaround research is the study of organizations' efforts 
to reverse performance decline. Thus, by definition, 
turnaround research is limited to companies that have 
experienced declining performance (Hambrick & Schecter,
19 83). In contrast, downsizing research is not; 
downsizing is pursued by healthy and unhealthy companies 
alike (Sutton & D'Aunno, 1989; Tomasko, 1987).
The second distinguishing characteristic between 
downsizing and turnaround research is breadth of focus. 
Downsizing studies have a narrow focus; they are concerned 
with the impact of reducing the number of employees on 
firm performance (D'Aveni, 1989) . In contrast, turnaround 
studies are concerned with reducing, increasing, or 
changing a firm's scope of operations (Hambrick &
Schecter, 1983) .
In summary, the present study is a turnaround study. 
Its focus is on the efforts of declining organizations to 
improve substandard performance.
Statement of Problem
Turnaround research generally has followed a pattern 
set by the first turnaround study: Schendel, Patton and 
Riggs (19 76) . It has focused solely on strategy content 
(the set of decisions regarding the goals, the range of 
businesses in which the firm chooses to operate, and 
competitive approaches used by these businesses -- Fahey & 
Christensen, 1986), and has followed an inductive approach
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(based on observation of a particular sample rather than 
on theoretical underpinnings -- Camerer, 1985). The 
exclusive focus of turnaround studies on strategy content 
and the inductive nature of previous studies drives the 
need for a model of turnaround that incorporates strategy 
process (the activities leading to and supporting 
strategic decisions -- Huff & Reger, 1987) and is based 
on theory.
Despite an early recognition that strategy process 
factors might explain differences in organizations' 
abilities to improve declining performance (Hambrick & 
Schecter, 19 83), past turnaround research has neglected 
process. Failing to investigate the impact of strategy 
process on a firm's ability to improve performance is a 
key omission; process acts both independently (Huff & 
Reger, 1987) and interacts with strategy content (Ketchen, 
Thomas & McDaniel, 1996) as an important determinant of 
firm performance.
Extant research has suggested that strategy process 
may play an integral role in turnaround. Indeed, it has 
been speculated that the difference between success and 
failure may be the means by which strategies are 
implemented (Hoffman, 19 89) . Research examining the 
relationship between turnaround and changes in top 
management group composition (e.g., Bibeault, 1982; Melin, 
1985; O'Neill, 1986a; Zimmerman, 1986) has hinted at the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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importance of strategy formulation and implementation in 
turnaround.
Although the main effects of strategy process would 
warrant investigation, the strongest driving force of this 
study is the interactive effects of strategy content and 
process. Generally, organizations that do not have 
consistency between strategy content and process exhibit 
lower performance than those organizations that do 
(Ketchen, Thomas & McDaniel, 1996; Miles, Snow, Meyer & 
Coleman, 1978). However, there are several organizational 
attributes associated with declining organizations (e.g., 
increases in conflict, secrecy, scapegoating, rigidity, 
and employee turnover -- Cameron, Whetten & Kim, 1987), 
and the cause and effect relationships of healthy 
organizations may not necessarily hold for declining 
organizations (McKinley, 1993). Thus, there is cause to 
examine whether the positive performance implications of 
achieving strategy content and process fit hold for 
organizations trying to recover from decline.
As noted previously, turnaround research has been of 
an inductive nature. Thus, there is also a need to base 
turnaround research on theory. Past turnaround research 
has shown that the strategy used in attempting to restore 
performance should be matched to the cause of declining 
performance (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) . However, the 
inductive nature of turnaround studies has prevented
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
consistent conceptual treatment of the cause of decline in 
turnaround studies. Further, because their basis is not 
in theory, the existing treatments of decline causes may 
be inadequate. This study addresses this limitation by
theoretically deriving the causes of decline with the
open-systems paradigm (Katz & Kahn, 1966).
Significance of Study
This study's significance is that it examines the 
role strategy content and process fit plays in turnaround. 
As noted, most turnaround research has focused solely on 
the role of strategy content. This study extends prior 
work by building a model that incorporates strategy 
process and includes theoretically-derived causes of 
performance decline.
This study offers the following two primary
contributions. First, the importance of strategy content
and process fit to turnaround performance is tested. 
Research outside the organizational decline research 
domain has stressed the positive performance implications 
of fit between strategy process and content (Miles, Snow, 
Meyer & Coleman, 1978), yet this link remains untested in 
the turnaround literature.
A widely-accepted notion of the strategy discipline 
is that our research needs to have ultimate application to 
the problems facing practitioners (Montgomery, Wernerfelt 
& Balakrishnan, 1989; Summer et al., 1990) . This study
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ultimately could enhance the ability of practitioners to 
improve organizational effectiveness. If the positive 
performance implications of strategy content and process 
fit are supported by this study and future studies, the 
discipline can suggest to practitioners that having 
consistency between their strategy content and processes 
may improve turnaround performance. Failure to support 
the positive performance implications of strategy content 
and process fit may also assist practitioners by focusing 
future research and, ultimately, identifying the issues 
critical to improving organizational performance.
The study's second contribution is the potential 
reconciliation of the conflicting predictions of the 
efficacy of strategic responses. Some authors have 
suggested a company's road back to satisfactory 
performance requires becoming more efficient in its 
present operations (e.g., Zimmerman, 1986). However, 
others have suggested that stressing efficiency leads only 
to further deterioration (D'Aveni, 1989), and that 
strategic reorientations (i.e., relatively large changes 
in strategy and structure -- Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) 
are needed to restore a company's performance (Barker,
1992). As detailed below, these conflicting predictions 
may be reconciled by matching the cause of decline with 
the appropriate strategy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Past research has treated causes of decline as either 
internal or external to the firm and has established the 
performance implications of linking strategy to the cause 
of decline (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) . Specifically, 
internal causes have been linked with an efficiency 
strategy (i.e., becoming more efficient by focusing on 
production and management systems -- Hambrick & Schecter, 
1983; Robbins & Pearce, 1992), and external causes have 
been linked with an entrepreneurial strategy (e.g., 
introducing new products, shifting to more desirable 
niches -- Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; entering new 
businesses -- Hofer, 1980). The present study posits that 
turnaround strategy should be matched with the cause of 
decline, but derives the causes of decline using the open- 
systerns paradigm (Katz & Kahn, 1966) . Using the open- 
systems paradigm as a theoretical basis, it would appear 
that external causes may be too broad of a classification 
(cf. Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
Trying to resolve problems coming from the entire external 
environment (i.e., both input and output environments) 
with an entrepreneurial strategy would likely be 
ineffective. An entrepreneurial strategy focuses on 
bringing the organization back into alignment solely with 
the output environment. Misalignment with the input 
environment would not be corrected by an entrepreneurial 
strategy. Hence, our understanding of an organization's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ability to restore performance may be enhanced by relating 
theoretically-derived causes of decline to the efficacy of 
turnaround strategies.
Summary of Remaining Chapters
Chapter 1 has laid the foundation for this study by:
1) placing this study within the broader research domain 
of organizational decline; 2) outlining the shortcomings 
of existing turnaround research; and, 3) underscoring the 
potential contributions of this study. Specifically, the 
present study improves on existing turnaround research by 
incorporating strategy process and theoretically-derived 
causes of decline into a model of turnaround performance.
Chapter 2 reviews extant literature on all the 
building blocks of this study's model of turnaround. In 
the first section, previous turnaround studies are 
surveyed for their treatment of strategy content. In the 
second section, the literature on two important aspects of 
strategy process (i.e., information usage and 
centralization of decision making) are reviewed. Relevant 
literature on fit between strategy process and content is 
highlighted in the third section. In the fourth section, 
the treatment of the causes of declining performance in 
extant turnaround research is reviewed, and the open- 
systems paradigm (Katz & Kahn, 1966) is offered as a 
theoretical basis for classifying causes. Literature on 
turnaround performance is reviewed in the final section.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Chapter 3 (Model Development and Hypotheses) develops 
a model depicting the positive performance implications 
of: 1) achieving fit between strategy content and process; 
and, 2) achieving fit between strategy and cause of 
decline. Hypotheses are developed for this model and 
offered for testing. Chapter 4 (Method) describes the 
sample, sources of data, measures, method of data 
collection, and statistical analyses used to test the 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 (Results) presents the results of 
primary data collection, descriptive statistics for all 
variables in the study, and results of the analyses used 
to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. The final 
chapter (Chapter 6 -- Discussion and Conclusion) reviews 
the study's results, acknowledges this study's 
limitations, and discusses avenues for future research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, the extant literature on all the 
constructs and the concept used to build a model of 
organizational turnaround are reviewed. The first section 
of this chapter reviews, from a content perspective, the 
conceptualizations of strategy used in previous turnaround 
studies. Next, attention turns to a review of strategy 
process. The literature on two important aspects of 
strategy formulation (i.e., information usage and 
centralization of decision making) is reviewed. Because 
the central contribution of this study is the examination 
of the role of fit between strategy content and process in 
turnaround, the third section of this chapter specifies 
the type of fit examined in this study and reviews the 
relevant literature.
The efficacy of strategic responses is, in part, 
determined by matching the response to the cause of 
performance deterioration (Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Thus, 
the fourth section reviews the causes of performance 
decline. Because past turnaround research has used an 
inductive method (i.e., based on observation -- Camerer,
19 85) for classifying causes of decline, the open-systems 
paradigm is discussed as a theoretical basis for a new 
classification scheme.
The objective of using recovery strategies is to 
improve firm performance. Thus, the last section reviews
12
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literature on turnaround performance. In the next 
chapter, strategy content, strategy process, cause of 
performance decline, fit, and turnaround performance are 
related in a model that provides the basis for predicting 
turnaround performance.
Strategy Content
Strategy content is the set of decisions regarding 
the goals, range of businesses in which the firm chooses 
to operate, and competitive approaches used by these 
businesses (Fahey & Christensen, 1986) . Strategy content 
is the primary means by which an organization aligns 
itself with its environment (Hrebiniak, Joyce & Snow,
1989), and thereby, enhances probability of survival.
Turnaround research has generally treated the content 
of turnaround strategies as either "entrepreneurial" or 
"efficiency" (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). An entrepreneurial 
strategy involves doing different things, whereas an 
efficiency strategy involves doing the same things more 
efficiently (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). The basic 
distinction between these two types of strategies is 
whether changes are made in a company's products or target 
market; an efficiency strategy does not involve changes, 
whereas an entrepreneurial strategy does (Pearce &
Robbins, 1993) .
A brief history on this dichotomy is helpful in 
understanding strategy content's role in turnaround. Two
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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early studies (Hofer, 1980; Schendel, Patton & Riggs,
1976) established a dichotomy of responses to declining 
performance. This dichotomy was based on whether the 
responses were considered either strategic or operational. 
For example, changing marketing processes, entering new 
businesses (Hofer, 1980), vertically integrating, 
diversifying, divesting, and changing top management 
(Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976) were considered strategic 
responses. On the other hand, reducing costs, assets 
(Hofer, 1980), and plant expenditures, improving the 
operations of functional areas, and improving efficiency 
(Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976) were considered 
operational responses. The basic distinction between 
strategic and operating responses was whether the company 
attempted to reverse declining performance by implementing 
strategic changes or increasing efficiency. Hence, these 
strategies were named "entrepreneurial" and "efficiency" 
by Hambrick and Schecter (1983).
Although both types of strategies may enhance 
performance, companies experiencing decline are limited in 
their ability (e.g., managerial and financial resources) 
to respond to decline with both entrepreneurial and 
efficiency strategies (Green, 1992; Pearce & Robbins,
1993; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981) . Instead, 
organizations stress either one or the other of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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strategies (Green, 1992; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins & 
Pearce, 1992) .
In summary, extant literature has identified two 
types of strategies to reverse declining performance. An 
entrepreneurial strategy involves a change in a company's 
products and target market (Pearce & Robbins, 1993) and 
focuses on products and market-based activities (Hambrick 
& Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993) . An efficiency 
strategy does not involve a change in a company's products 
or target market (D'Aveni, 1989; Pearce & Robbins, 1993), 
and focuses on production and management systems (Hambrick 
& Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993) .
Strategy Process
The strategy process includes strategy formulation 
and implementation, and extant literature suggests that 
how a firm's strategic decisions are formulated and 
implemented may impact firm performance (e.g., Dean & 
Sharfman, 1996; Huff & Reger, 1987; Priem, Rasheed & 
Kotulic, 1985) . Declining performance is thought to 
impact the formulation of strategies (Cameron, Whetten & 
Kim, 1987; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981). Thus, this 
study focuses on strategy formulation because it not only 
is an important determinant of organizational performance, 
but also is affected by declining performance.
Strategy formulation is a sequence of behaviors where 
decision makers scan the environment and gather
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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information about important trends and events (Mintzberg, 
1987) . This definition is the basis for selecting the two 
aspects of strategy formulation for examination in this 
study (i.e., centralization of decision making and 
information usage). Centralization refers to the level(s) 
at which decisions are made for the organization (Pugh, 
Hickson, Hinings & Turner, 1968). Centralization was 
selected for examination because it fundamentally reflects 
"who" makes the strategic decisions. Information usage, 
which refers to the quantity of data that organizations 
gather and process in addressing strategic decisions (Daft 
& Macintosh, 19 81; Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993; Thomas & 
McDaniel, 1990), was selected because it fundamentally 
reflects how comprehensive an organization's information 
gathering was during strategy formulation.
The selection of centralization of decision making 
and information usage for further examination is supported 
by the convergence of strategy research in general, extant 
turnaround research, and organizational decline 
literature. The importance of information usage and 
centralization of decision making to strategy formulation 
has been supported by general strategy literature (e.g., 
information usage -- Daft & Lengel, 19 86; Govindarajan, 
1988; Ketchen, Thomas & McDaniel, 1996; Thomas, Clark & 
Gioia, 1993; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990; centralization --
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Chandler, 1962; Govindarajan, 1988; Rumelt, 1974; Vancil, 
1980) .
Although turnaround research involving strategy 
formulation has been quite limited, it reiterates the same 
two key aspects: 1) the decision makers; and, 2) the role 
of information. More specifically, research examining 
changes in top management groups has shown that strategy 
formulation is positively influenced by the new and 
multiple perspectives of decision makers (Bibeault, 19 82; 
Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1986a). Additionally, case studies 
have highlighted the role of gathering large amounts of 
information to interpret a changed environment (Zimmerman, 
1986).
Organizational decline literature has also 
highlighted the same two aspects of strategy formulation 
(i.e., centralization of decision making and information 
usage). Organizational processes are posited to be 
influenced by negative performance; more specifically, 
information usage may decrease and decision making may 
become more centralized in response to perceptions of poor 
performance (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981). However, 
the responses of organizations may vary because top 
managers in different organizations often construct 
differing interpretations of the same strategic issue 
(Meyer, 1982). Based on these varying interpretations, 
decision making may not become more centralized, and
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information usage may not decrease. Clearly, a better 
understanding of both information usage and centralization 
of decision making is warranted.
Information usage. Information usage is a vital 
component of information processing (Thomas & McDaniel,
1990), and information processing plays an integral role 
in allowing an organization to accomplish internal tasks, 
coordinate diverse activities, and interpret the external 
environment (Daft & Lengel, 19 86). This section begins by 
reviewing research that highlights the role of information 
usage in a firm's adaptation to its environment. Then, 
literature discussing the contingency nature of 
information usage is summarized.
Managers gather information about the external 
environment so that they can mediate between the external 
environment and the organization to bring about fit among 
strategy, structure and environment (Andrews, 1971; 
Mintzberg, 1978; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). It is this 
fit among strategy, structure, and environment that 
enhances the probability of survival (Andrews, 19 71). 
Because environments often are changing (Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985), organizations must continually process 
information to learn about and interpret their environment 
to survive (Daft & Lengel, 19 86).
Previous literature posited that organizations have 
different information requirements based on the situation
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(Daft & Lengel, 1986; Galbraith 1973; Hedberg, 1981).
High information usage is not desirable in every situation 
because of the costs associated with acquiring and 
processing information (Hedberg, 1981). Thus, the 
benefits of obtaining additional information must be 
weighed against the costs.
The following contingency factors determine the 
anticipated benefits of information usage: 1) environment 
(Hedberg, 1981); 2) strategy (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990); 
and, 3) changes in either environment or strategy 
(Bartunek, 1988; Freeman & Cameron, 1993; Tichy & Devanna, 
1986). The first contingency factor is the environment. 
Rapidly changing and complex environments involve great 
uncertainty and ambiguity, whereas stable and simple 
environments involve less uncertainty and ambiguity 
(Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Because information reduces 
uncertainty and ambiguity (Galbraith, 1973) , rapidly 
changing and complex environments require much more 
information than do slowly changing and simple 
environments (Hedberg, 1981).
An organization's strategy also determines the amount 
of information required. Successful innovation involves 
using large amounts of information (Monge, Cozzens, & 
Contractor, 1992). Thus, it follows that strategies 
stressing innovation (e.g., differentiation -- Porter,
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1980) require large amounts of information (Govindarajan, 
1988) .
Strategies involving domain expansion also require 
large amounts of information. The domain offense 
strategy, which is marked by attempts to expand an 
organization's domain through actions such as pursuing 
additional markets (Miles, 1982), requires higher levels 
of communication due to the increasing administrative 
functions (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990) . In contrast, domain 
defense, which focuses on protecting an existing domain 
through cultivating repeat customers (Miles, 1982), does 
not require large amounts of information (Thomas &
McDaniel, 199 0).
Finally, the magnitude of change in either 
environment or strategy is an important determinant of 
information requirements. Because a high level of 
communication is required to help members understand new 
situations (e.g., a new strategy or changed external 
environment -- Bartunek, 1988; Tichey & Devanna, 1986), 
large changes in strategy or environment require more 
information, interpretation (Daft & Lengel, 1986), and 
extensive communication within the organization (Freeman & 
Cameron, 1993). In contrast, incremental changes in 
environment or strategy require less extensive use of 
information (Freeman & Cameron, 1993).
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In summary, information usage plays an integral role 
in enabling organizational adaptation. The amount of 
information usage needed depends on an organization's 
environment, strategy, and changes in either environment 
or strategy.
Centralization of decision making. A highly- 
centralized organization has its strategic decisions made 
by members of the top management group only; in contrast, 
decisions are made throughout a highly-decentralized 
organization. Centralization is generally associated with 
relatively slow decision making processes, high control 
over operations, inflexibility, and an efficiency focus.
In contrast, decentralization is associated with fast 
decision making processes, low control over operations, 
flexibility, and an effectiveness focus (Hage, 1965) .
Extant literature has posited a contingency 
relationship between the appropriate level of 
centralization and the following: 1) strategy (Thomas & 
McDaniel, 1990); 2) change in strategy (Freeman & Cameron, 
1993) ; and, 3) change in environment (Lawrence & Dyer,
19 83). The first contingency factor is strategy. Because 
centralized decision making is best for efficiency and 
control (Hage, 19 65), it enhances the performance of 
organizations using strategies stressing efficiency 
(Govindarajan, 1988). Examples of strategies stressing 
efficiency include cost-leadership (Porter, 19 80) and
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domain defense (Miles, 1982). However, centralized 
decision making's emphasis on efficiency and control 
discourages innovation (Govindarajan, 1988; Monge, Cozzens 
& Contractor, 1992) . Thus, it hinders the performance of 
organizations using strategies that stress innovation 
(e.g., differentiation -- Porter, 1980; domain offense -- 
Miles, 1982) .
Change in strategy is the second contingency factor. 
Incremental changes require less participation in the 
decision making process. In contrast, large changes 
require decentralized decision making for success (Freeman 
& Cameron, 1993) .
The rate of environmental change is the final 
contingency factor. Rapidly changing environments require 
more frequent adaptations for an organization to maintain 
alignment with the environment (Tushman & Romanelli,
1985). Adaptiveness is enhanced by decentralization 
because managers making decisions interact directly with 
the environment, resulting in more timely and effective 
responses (Hage, 1965; Price, 1968). Thus, decentralized 
decision making enhances the performance of organizations 
in rapidly-changing environments (Koberg, 19 87) .
Conversely, organizations in stable environments require 
fewer changes to stay aligned with their environment 
(Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) and, thus, are best served by 
centralized decision making (Burns & Stalker, 1961).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 3
In summary, information usage and centralization of 
decision making are important to strategy processes in all 
organizations(e.g., Chandler, 1962; Daft & Lengel, 1986; 
Thomas & McDaniel, 1990; Vancil, 1980) and, especially, in 
declining organizations (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981). 
Extant literature has highlighted the contingency 
relationships of information usage and centralization of 
decision making. High levels of information usage enhance 
organization performance when the organization: 1) 
operates in rapidly changing and complex environments 
(Hedberg, 1981) ; 2) has adopted a strategy stressing 
product innovation (Monge, Cozzens & Contractor, 1992) or 
involving domain expansion (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990) ; or,
3) has experienced relatively large strategic or 
environmental changes (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Freeman & 
Cameron, 1993). Decentralized decision making enhances 
organizational performance when the organization: 1) has 
adopted a strategy stressing product innovation 
(Govindarajan, 1988) ; 2) has experienced relatively large 
strategic changes (Freeman & Cameron, 1993); or, 3) 
operates in a rapidly changing and uncertain environment 
(Koberg, 1987) .
Fit
This section first establishes the conceptual 
importance of fit. Then, because statistical treatment 
and theoretical conceptualization are necessarily
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interwoven (Venkatraman, 1989), attention turns to the 
statistical treatment of fit.
Fit (also termed consistency or coalignment) is an 
important concept in strategic management. The 
performance implications of achieving fit among strategy, 
structure and environment have long been established in 
strategy research (e.g., Andrews, 1971; Chandler, 1962; 
Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Miles & Snow, 
1978; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). Indeed, the extent 
of fit between strategy and the external environment has a 
significant positive impact on performance (Anderson & 
Zeithaml, 1984; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990).
Conversely, poor performance is an important indication 
that a company's strategy does not fit its environment and 
signals that changes may be necessary (Boeker & Goodstein,
1991).
Not only is fit between environment and strategy 
important, but also fit between strategy content and 
process is important. Fit between strategy content and 
process has positive performance implications (Miles &
Snow, 1978). Miles and Snow's strategy typology (1978), 
one of the discipline's foundational strategy typologies, 
is based on the extent of fit between strategy process and 
content. Miles & Snow (1978) found that organizations are 
faced with three interrelated problems (one related to 
strategy content and two related to strategy process) that
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must be solved with solutions that are consistent with 
each other (Miles & Snow, 1978) . The strategy content 
problem is the determination of the product/service to be 
produced and target market. The other problems involve 
strategy process, and include: 1) creating a system to 
operationalize management's solution to the strategy 
content problem; and, 2) establishing coordinating and 
controlling internal processes relating to both past and 
future strategic decisions (Miles & Snow, 1978). To be 
successful, an organization's solutions to these problems 
must be consistent with each other. Therefore, strategy 
process and content should be tightly linked.
The conceptualization and statistical treatment of 
fit are necessarily interwoven (Venkatraman, 1989) . In 
the strategy literature, fit generally has been approached 
from one of two broadly-defined theoretical and 
methodological perspectives: l) holistic; or 2) 
reductionist (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990) . The holistic 
perspective is based on the premise that it is important 
to retain the applicable constructs' multidimensional 
nature, and is consistent with configurational research 
(e.g., Ketchen, Thomas & Snow, 1993; Miller, 1981; Miller 
& Friesen, 19 84). This perspective does not focus on 
linear relationships among independent variables and, 
instead, focuses on whether performance varies across 
different combinations (i.e., configurations) of
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independent variables. Conversely, the reductionist 
perspective generally focuses on linear relationships 
among variables (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990), and, thus, 
may provide evidence of causal relationships (i.e., the 
degree to which an independent variable impacts a 
dependent variable -- Miller & Mintzberg, 1983).
As noted above, the statistical treatment and 
theoretical conceptualization of fit are interwoven.
Thus, the theoretical conceptualization dictates the 
statistical treatment. The underlying theory of this 
study is strategic choice. The underlying assumptions of 
strategic choice are that: 1) managers make decisions 
regarding how organizations respond to environmental 
conditions; and, 2) these decisions are critical 
determinants of organizational outcomes (Child, 1972). 
Strategic choice is a descendent of contingency theory 
(Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 19 85) , which asserts that there 
is a relationship between two or more variables that 
predicts a third variable (Schoonhoven, 1981) . The type 
of fit examined in this paper focuses on linear or 
bivariate relationships and, thus, is approached with a 
reductionist perspective (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). 
Cause of Declining Performance
Although considering the cause of the performance 
decline when assessing the efficacy of the recovery 
strategy was proposed early in the research stream
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(Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976), this has not been done 
consistently. Turnaround studies have either: 1) ignored 
the cause of declining performance (e.g., Hambrick & 
Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Schendel & Patton, 1976); 2) 
not related the cause to the recovery strategy (e.g., 
Bibeault, 1982) ; 3) not distinguished among causes (e.g., 
Melin, 1985; O'Neill, 1986b); or, 4) inductively derived 
the causes of decline (Robbins & Pearce, 19 92; Schendel, 
Patton & Riggs, 1976). This section first reviews 
literature on cause of decline. Then, literature that 
serves as the foundation for a theoretically-based 
classification scheme is reviewed.
Based on observation of turnaround firms, the first 
turnaround study (Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976) 
dichotomized causes of performance decline as either poor 
strategy or poor operations. Poor strategy was defined as 
the inability to adapt to a changing environment, and poor 
operations were defined as inefficient operations or poor 
implementation of an otherwise sound strategy.
Specifically, decreased profit margins, increased wages, 
increased competition, and inadequate raw materials were 
treated as indicators of poor strategy; depressed price 
levels, recessions, strikes, labor problems, and excess 
plant capacity were treated as indicators of poor 
operations (Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 19 76). Strategic 
responses were suggested to improve declining performance
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resulting from poor strategy, and operating responses were 
suggested to improve downturns resulting from poor 
operations (Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976).
A recent study (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) built on the 
work of Schendel, Patton and Riggs (19 76) and treated the 
causes of decline as either internal or external to the 
firm. Robbins and Pearce (1992) found that an efficiency 
strategy reversed performance declines caused by internal 
causes, and an entrepreneurial strategy reversed 
externally-caused performance problems. Internal causes 
included lack of operating control, overexpansion, 
excessive leverage, and deficiencies in the top management 
group. External causes included economic problems, 
competitive changes, technological changes, and social 
changes (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) .
The distinction between internal and external causes 
is intuitively appealing. Although Robbins and Pearce 
(1992) did not theoretically derive this dichotomy, a 
possible theoretical basis for the distinction is the 
conceptualization of organizations as open systems (Katz & 
Kahn, 1966). However, as will be discussed below, an 
open-systems view of the firm suggests that prescribing 
the same turnaround strategy for all external causes may 
be inappropriate.
The open-systems paradigm as a basis for classifying 
causes. The open-systems paradigm views the organization
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as highly dependent on its environment for the resources 
necessary for its continued existence; in contrast, closed 
systems view organizations as self-contained structures 
that are independent of their environment (Katz & Kahn, 
1966). Open systems are characterized by three primary 
functions: 1) importation of resources from the 
environment; 2) Throughput of the resources within the 
organization; and, 3) output of resources to the 
environment. Difficulties in performing any of the 
functions can threaten the viability of the organization 
(Katz & Kahn, 19 66) . Thus, causes of decline can 
originate in either the input or output environment, or 
inside the firm.
Input-environmental causes focus on difficulties 
involved in obtaining resources. The environment is the 
source of an organization's resources (Koberg, 1987;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and one tenet of the open- 
systems paradigm is that organizations must continue to 
import resources to survive (Katz & Kahn, 1966). Thus, 
changes in the input environment are factors to which an 
organization must adjust. Changes that reduce the 
availability of resources are especially noteworthy. 
Scarcity typically increases the costs of resources, and 
may limit the throughput and output of the organizations. 
Thus, the impact of scarce resources on organizational 
performance can be extreme (McKinley, 1987). Examples of
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input-environmental causes, identified in a survey of 
practitioners (Robbins & Pearce, 1992), include the 
following: l) interest rate hikes; 2) credit squeezes; 
and, 3) high or increasing prices of raw materials, energy 
and labor. Lack of these or other key resources bring 
about organizational decline.
In contrast, output-environmental causes of decline 
focus on difficulties involved in exporting a firm's 
output. The output of resources (that were imported and 
then transformed within the organization) back to the 
environment is the mechanism that allows for continued 
importation of new energy (Katz & Kahn, 1966). In other 
words, changes in the output environment may threaten an 
organization's ability to sell its product/service.
Because revenues from the sales of products/services are 
the means for obtaining future resources, changes in the 
output environment may lead to declining performance. 
Examples of output-environmental causes of decline, 
identified by practitioners (Robbins & Pearce, 1992) , 
include the following: 1) a competitor's new range of 
products; and, 2) failure to react to changing lifestyles, 
ages of the population, consumer attitudes, or consumer 
tastes.
All external causes should not be treated in the same 
manner (cf. Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins & Pearce,
1992). Changes in the input environment may create
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problems with regard to importing resources, whereas 
changes in the output environment may create problems 
associated with selling products. This distinction is 
important because of the different responses required: 1) 
changes in an organization's strategic orientation (i.e., 
the business an organization is in and method with which 
it competes -- Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) are required by 
changes in the output environment (e.g., changes in demand 
or product users); and, 2) changes in an organization's 
processes and structure are necessitated by changes in the 
input environment (e.g., reductions in resource 
munificence -- Yasai-Ardekani, 1989). Thus, external 
causes should be treated as coming from either the input 
or output environments.
Research has shown the wisdom of dichotomizing the 
environmental causes of decline as input- and output- 
environmental; for example, D'Aveni & MacMillan (1990) 
found that companies focusing attention on the input 
environment when the problem was in the output environment 
were more likely to fail. Specifically, in responding to 
severely declining demand, companies that focused more 
attention on the factors related to the output environment 
(e.g., customer needs and changing demand) than on factors 
related to the input environment were successful.
The cause of performance decline may also be internal 
to the organization. In the long term, organizations
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survive only if they import more resources than they 
expend in the processes of transformation and exportation 
(Katz & Kahn, 1966). Hence, unless resources are 
overabundant, organizations must be efficiently organized 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Therefore, attention to 
internal causes is appropriate. Examples of internal 
causes of decline include: l) inadequate or misguided 
control systems; 2) inefficient organization; 3) excessive 
financial leverage; and, 4) inefficient manufacturing 
techniques (Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
In summary, little attention has been paid to the 
causes of decline in the existing literature. Even less 
effort has been devoted to constructing the theoretical 
basis for understanding the cause of decline. Research 
has been inductive in nature; hence, little consistency 
across studies has been noted. Based on the open-systems 
paradigm, causes can be classified as to their origin in 
either the input or output environments, or internal to 
the firm. The benefits of this theoretically-derived 
treatment are twofold: 1) because it is based on theory, 
the conceptual treatment can be consistent across future 
studies; and, 2) due to their different foci, factors from 
the input and output environments are conceptually 
distinct, and this classification system treats them 
accordingly.
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Turnaround Performance
As noted in Chapter l, Strategy's emphasis on firm 
performance distinguishes it from related disciplines 
(Meyer, 1991). Further, the turnaround research stream's 
emphasis on improving firm performance distinguishes it 
from the vast majority of the other organizational decline 
literature. Performance has been defined as the economic 
and social outcomes associated with organizational actions 
(Hrebiniak, Joyce & Snow, 1989), and can be conceptualized 
in terms of financial, operational, or organizational 
effectiveness outcomes (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986) . 
Financial outcomes refer to the accounting-based 
indicators assumed to reflect fulfillment of an 
organization's economic goals. Operational outcomes refer 
to nonfinancial indicators (e.g., market share, hospital 
occupancy) of an organization's operating performance. 
Finally, organizational effectiveness refers to the degree 
to which the organization satisfies the multiple, 
conflicting goals of its stakeholders (Venkatraman & 
Ramanujam, 1986) .
Although operational dimensions have received some 
attention (e.g., market position -- Hofer, 1980;
Zimmerman, 1986), most turnaround research has focused on 
financial outcomes (Hoffman, 1989). This emphasis may be 
due to the relationship between financial performance and 
organizational survival: without an acceptable level of
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financial performance, an organization will fail in the 
long term (Porter, 1980).
Turnaround research has used various referents. The 
performance referents used have included: 1) industry 
profits (O'Neill, 1981; Pant, 1991; Robbins & Pearce,
1992); 2) changes in Gross National Product (Schendel & 
Patton, 1976; Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976); 3) returns 
of riskless investments such as government securities 
(Barker, 1992); 4) predownturn profitability levels 
(Robbins & Pearce, 1992); and, 5) seemingly arbitrary 
benchmarks (return on investment greater than 20% -- 
Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). Of the various referents, 
only the return from riskless investments has its basis in 
theory. Returns on riskless investments serve as a 
conservative approximation of risk-adjusted rates of 
return, and organizations cannot survive as economic 
entities if they do not earn at least a risk-adjusted rate 
of return for their owners (Porter, 1980).
In sum, turnaround performance is an organization's 
performance following its declining performance.
Turnaround performance has been examined primarily along 
the financial dimension of performance, and successful 
turnaround performance requires that organizations earn 
returns greater than the risk-free rate.
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Summary
This chapter began with a review of strategy content 
in turnaround literature that identified two types of 
strategies: 1) entrepreneurial, which involve changes in a 
company's products or target market; and, 2) efficiency, 
which involve becoming more efficient in producing the 
same products for the same market.
Next, literature highlighting information usage and 
centralization of decision making as important aspects of 
strategy process was reviewed. Additionally, the 
contingency nature of information usage and centralization 
was emphasized. Increased information usage is required 
by: 1) changing and complex environments; 2) strategies 
characterized by changing or expanding product lines and 
target markets; or, 3) large changes in either environment 
or strategy. Decentralized decision making is more 
appropriate when: 1) the organization's strategy stresses 
innovation; 2) there is a large change in strategy; or, 3) 
the environment is turbulent or uncertain.
The literature on fit was also reviewed, showing that 
fit between strategy process and content, and fit between 
strategy and cause of decline are important determinants 
of performance. Additionally, the reductionist 
perspective, and the related statistical treatment, were 
identified as appropriate for this study.
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The fourth section reviewed the causes of performance 
decline. Based on the open-systems paradigm, causes can 
be considered as originating in the input or output 
environments, or internal to the firm. In the last 
section, the literature on turnaround performance was 
reviewed. Turnaround performance is the performance of a 
firm following declining performance and consists of 
financial, operating, and effectiveness dimensions.
This chapter has served to highlight both the state 
of knowledge about turnaround and the gaps in knowledge. 
Regarding the former, researchers generally agree that: 1) 
companies use either an entrepreneurial or efficiency 
turnaround strategy; 2) information usage and 
centralization of decision making are important aspects of 
strategy process and exhibit a relationship with 
organizational performance that is contingent on strategy 
and environment; 3) generally, consistency between 
strategy content and process has positive performance 
implications; 4) turnaround performance is 
multidimensional; and, 5) the cause of performance decline 
should be accounted for in assessing the efficacy of 
turnaround strategies.
Turning to the gaps in knowledge about turnaround, 
the relationship linking strategy content and process fit 
to turnaround performance has not yet been tested.
Further, the cause of performance decline has not been
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consistently treated across past studies, and the 
performance implications of achieving fit between strategy 
and the theoretically-derived causes of decline proposed 
in this study have not been assessed.
In the next chapter, a model is developed that 
predicts the following relationships: 1) fit between 
strategy content and process is an important determinant 
of turnaround performance; and, 2) the closer a firm's 
recovery strategy fits the cause of performance decline, 
the better its turnaround performance.
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CHAPTER 3: MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
The last chapter reviewed literature on the four 
constructs (strategy content, strategy process, cause of 
performance decline, and turnaround performance) and the 
concept (fit) that are used to develop a model of 
turnaround performance. In this chapter, these constructs 
and concept are integrated into a model that suggests that 
fit between strategy process and content is a key 
determinant of turnaround performance. Because matching 
the strategy to the cause of decline determines the 
efficacy of strategic responses, cause of decline is 
included in the model as a contextual antecedent.
In the first section of this chapter, a proposition 
relating fit between strategy content and process to 
turnaround performance is developed, and testable 
hypotheses related to this proposition are offered. Next, 
a proposition about the positive benefits of tailoring 
turnaround strategy to the cause of decline is developed, 
and testable hypotheses are offered.
Fit and Turnaround Performance
Strategy content and process are unavoidably 
intertwined. The conceptualization of strategy as a 
firm's pattern of strategic decisions over time 
(Mintzberg, 1987) emphasizes the manner in which strategy 
content influences subsequent strategy processes. An 
organization may begin its existence by making strategy
38
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content decisions (e.g., choosing its domain and method 
for developing competitive advantage) based on basic 
causal maps of the environment and organization (Andrews, 
1971). However, the outcomes associated with the original 
and subsequent strategy content decisions are retained in 
organizational memory (Milliken & Lant, 1991;Walsh & 
Ungson, 1991) . Organizational memory contains the revised 
set of causal maps, and determines the collection, 
analysis, and interpretation of data. Consequently, 
organizational memory influences subsequent actions (Hall, 
1984). Thus, a key to understanding a firm's present 
strategic processes is understanding its history of 
previous strategy content decisions (Ketchen, Thomas & 
McDaniel, 1996).
Strategy processes not only lag past strategy content 
decisions but also lead future decisions (Miles & Snow, 
1978). The content of a firm's strategy limits strategic 
decision making processes (Daft & Weick, 1984). 
Subsequently, processes activated for making strategic 
decisions about the future are constrained by the 
mechanisms in place to achieve existing strategic goals. 
Thus, the interpretation of a firm's current strategic 
options is a reflection of the strategic processes and 
content embodied in its past strategic decisions (Milliken 
& Lant, 1991).
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Strategy process and content are interwoven 
conceptually (Huff & Reger, 1987) and temporally (Miller & 
Friesen, 1983). An implication of this tight linkage is 
that process/content fit may influence performance by 
expediting (or hindering) internal coordination and 
adaptation to the demands of the environment (Ketchen, 
Thomas & McDaniel, 1996) . Thus, process/content fit is an 
important determinant of firm performance. Although the 
interaction between strategy content and process has 
received scant attention in the turnaround literature, 
case study research noted that process and content ought 
to act coherently in a turnaround (Zimmerman, 1986). 
Accordingly, the model presented in Figure 3-1 begins with 
an overall expectation that:
Proposition 1: Fit between strategy process and 
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The general prediction of the positive performance 
implications of strategy process/content fit suggests that 
relationships exist among performance and specific 
strategy content and process variables. Thus, attention 
turns to developing these relationships.
Strategy content and information usage. As noted in 
Chapter 2, information usage (i.e., the quantity of data 
that organizations gather and process in addressing 
strategic decisions -- Daft & Macintosh, 1981; Thomas & 
McDaniel, 1990) plays an important role in strategy 
formulation. Information usage influences an 
organization's interpretation of environmental events 
(Thomas & McDaniel, 1990). In turn, interpretation (the 
process of translating data into knowledge and 
understanding -- Daft & Weick, 1984), ultimately affects 
organizational actions (Dutton, Fahey & Narayanan, 19 83) 
and performance (Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993) . Thus, 
information usage ultimately plays a key role in 
organizational actions and performance.
Because organizations are dependent on the 
environment for resources (Katz & Kahn, 1966), 
organizations must process information to learn about and 
interpret their environment to survive (Daft & Lengel,
1986). However, the costs of obtaining information can be 
high (Hedberg, 1981), and a firm's information usage 
requirements are based on its strategy (Thomas & McDaniel,
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1990). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that 
organizations have different information requirements 
based on the strategy used to respond to declining 
performance.
Based on the nature of an entrepreneurial strategy, 
it appears there would be a fit between high levels of 
information usage and an entrepreneurial strategy. An 
entrepreneurial strategy involves changes in a company's 
products and/or target market (Pearce & Robbins, 1993) and 
focuses on products and market-based activities (Hambrick 
Sc Schecter, 1983) . More specifically, an entrepreneurial 
strategy includes product changes, shifting to more 
desirable niches (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983), or entering 
new businesses (Hofer, 19 80). Thus, an entrepreneurial 
strategy reflects ambiguity and uncertainty regarding 
consumer reaction to product or target market changes as 
well as high levels of product/service innovation.
Changes involving relatively high levels of 
uncertainty or ambiguity require that an organization 
process large amounts of information before decision 
makers in the organization are willing to act (Huber, 
O'Connell, & Cummings, 1975) . The amount of data gathered 
reflects an organization's perceived level of 
understanding of a situation (MacKay, 1969; Tushman & 
Nadler, 19 78), and large amounts of information give 
decision makers a more complete understanding of causal
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relationships (Thompson, 19 67) . Gathering large amounts 
of information enables decision makers to make faster 
decisions, and decision making speed is of the essence for 
companies facing rapid, discontinuous changes in demand, 
competition, or product component technology (Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois, 1988). Thus, the uncertainty and ambiguity 
involved with an entrepreneurial strategy require that the 
organization gather large amounts of information to speed 
decision making and, thereby, enhance organizational 
performance.
Further, the high level of product/service innovation 
and the increase in product/service diversity associated 
with an entrepreneurial strategy require large amounts of 
information. Successful product/service innovation 
depends on high levels of information usage (Monge,
Cozzens & Contractor, 1992). Further, increased 
product/service diversity increases administrative and 
technological complexity; to cope, organizations must 
process large amounts of information (Thomas & McDaniel, 
1990). Hence, an entrepreneurial strategy and information 
usage are expected to be related in the following manner: 
Hypothesis la: For organizations choosing an 
entrepreneurial strategy in response to decline, 
the amount of information usage will be 
positively related to turnaround performance.
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An efficiency strategy does not involve 
product/service or target market changes (D'Aveni, 1989; 
Pearce & Robbins, 1993), but, instead, focus on a 
company's production and management systems (Hambrick & 
Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993). Typical 
activities associated with an efficiency strategy include 
cost cutting and selling assets (Hambrick & Schecter,
1983; Hofer, 1980) . An efficiency strategy is most like a 
domain defense strategy. Organizations following a domain 
defense strategy use less information because their 
administrative functions are more efficient and 
standardized (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990).
An efficiency strategy is incremental in nature. 
Because of the relatively low ambiguity and uncertainty 
surrounding small changes (Huber, O'Connell & Cummings, 
1975), incremental changes require less information usage 
(Freeman & Cameron, 1993). Further, an efficiency 
strategy requires little product/service innovation, and, 
hence, do not require high levels of information usage 
(Monge, Cozzens & Contractor, 1992).
There are substantial financial costs, as well as 
opportunity costs, associated with acquiring information 
(Hedberg, 1981) . Because of these costs, procuring large 
amounts of information is inconsistent with an efficiency 
strategy; the increased costs are not justified by the
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demands of the strategy. Thus, the following relationship 
is expected:
Hypothesis lb: For organizations choosing an 
efficiency strategy in response to decline, the 
amount of information usage will be negatively 
related to turnaround performance.
Strategy content and centralization of decision 
making. Centralization of decision making refers to the 
level at which decisions are made for the organization 
(Jennergren, 1981). Centralized decision making is 
associated with high control over operations, 
inflexibility, and an efficiency focus; in contrast, 
decentralized decision making is associated with low 
control over operations, flexibility, and an effectiveness 
focus (Hage, 19 65) . The two types of turnaround 
strategies differ concerning the desired amount of control 
and flexibility, and their focus on efficiency or 
effectiveness. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that 
different levels of centralization fit with the two types 
of turnaround strategy.
Centralization of decision making inhibits strategic 
experimentation, hinders accurate interpretation of the 
marketplace, and drives away innovative employees. 
Specifically, centralization places responsibility for 
decision making with the highest managers in the 
hierarchy, who may be more isolated from the realities of
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the marketplace (Starbuck, Greve & Hedberg, 1978).
Further, centralization discourages lower-level employees 
from adopting innovations or changes that they perceive 
will reverse the decline (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton,
1981). Thus, centralization hinders an organization's 
ability to introduce product/service innovations. Because 
the ability to introduce product/service innovation is a 
particularly important ability for organizations choosing 
an entrepreneurial strategy, it is predicted that: 
Hypothesis lc: For organizations choosing an 
entrepreneurial strategy in response to decline, 
centralization of decision making will be negatively 
related to turnaround performance.
The costs associated with centralized decision making 
are high for organizations adapting to rapid and 
discontinuous changes in demand, competitors, and product 
technology (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). However, this 
relationship may not hold in situations where rapid 
product changes are not required (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 
1987, 1988). Indeed, because an efficiency strategy does 
not stress product innovation, the decreased ability to 
introduce product innovations associated with 
centralization would have little negative impact.
Conversely, centralization enhances control over 
costs and is positively related to efficiency gains in an 
organization's present operations (Huber, Miller & Glick,
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1990) . Thus, the benefits of highly centralized decision 
making would enhance organizational performance for those 
organizations using an efficiency strategy. Hence, the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis Id: For organizations using an 
efficiency strategy in response to decline, 
centralization of decision making will be 
positively related to turnaround performance.
Cause of Performance Decline: The Context of Turnaround 
An organization's strategy provides a framework 
within which its managers understand their environment and 
interpret strategic issues (Hambrick, 1981; Meyer, 1982; 
Thomas & McDaniel, 1990). Strategy serves as an 
information filter separating the critical from 
insignificant (Huff, 1982). Specifically, an 
organization's top managers focus on information needed to 
execute its strategy and ignore information that seems 
irrelevant (Hambrick, 1981).
The foci of turnaround strategies differ; an 
efficiency strategy is input-environment (on a company's 
procurement systems) and internally focused (on a 
company's production and manufacturing systems -- Hambrick 
Sc Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993). In contrast, 
an entrepreneurial strategy is output-environmentally 
focused (on a firm's products and market-based activities 
-- Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993).
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Thus, turnaround strategies focus managers' attention on 
different aspects of the environment or on the internal 
processes of the organization.
Because strategy directs organizational attention to 
specific aspects of the environment, matching the strategy 
to the cause of decline becomes imperative. An 
organization's efforts should focus on matching its 
strategy with the cause of decline, else attention will be 
diverted away from the true problem (D'Aveni & MacMillan, 
1990) . If attention is diverted away from the true 
problem, continued decline is likely. Hence, the model of 
turnaround performance (Figure 3-1) also is built on a 
second general proposition:
Proposition 2: The closer a firm's recovery 
strategy matches the cause of performance 
decline, the better its turnaround performance.
The general prediction of the positive implications 
of achieving fit between strategy and cause of decline 
suggests that relationships exist among specific 
strategies and causes of decline. Hence attention turns 
to developing these relationships.
Input-environmental causes of decline. The 
environment is the source of the resources an organization 
needs to survive (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Koberg, 1987; Pfeffer 
Sc Salancik, 19 78) . Thus, anything interfering with the 
importation of resources may cause performance decline.
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Changes in the input environment may change the way 
an organization acquires resources (Katz & Kahn, 1966), 
but do not alter the basic relationship between the 
organization and its output environment. An 
entrepreneurial strategy focuses managerial attention on 
the output environment. Thus, an entrepreneurial strategy 
would divert attention from the cause of decline, and, 
thus, not fit with input environmental causes of decline 
to reverse the decline.
In contrast, an efficiency strategy focuses 
managerial attention on a firm's internal processes and 
procurement systems. Thus, the likelihood of management 
effectively dealing with the impact of changes in the 
input environment is increased by the adoption of an 
efficiency strategy. Input-environmental causes of 
decline (such as increasing resource prices -- Robbins & 
Pearce, 1992) effectively raise the costs of production 
unless countered by changes in an organization's 
production systems. By becoming more efficient, 
organizations reduce their dependence on a resource 
(Thompson, 1967). Thus, because of its focus on the input 
environment and production systems, an efficiency strategy 
can reduce the impact of scarcity and increasing costs of 
resources. Hence, the following hypothesis is offered: 
Hypothesis 2a: To the extent that an 
organization's decline is related to input -
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environmental factors, an efficiency strategy 
will lead to positive turnaround performance.
Internal causes of decline. All organizations 
survive over the long term only if they import more 
resources than they expend (Katz & Kahn, 1966); therefore, 
organizations must be efficiently organized and operated 
to be successful. However, not all organizations are 
efficiently organized and operated. Thus, decline may 
originate from within an organization. Examples of 
internal causes of decline include inefficient growth, 
excessive leverage, lack of control, and high production 
costs (Robbins & Pearce, 1992).
As noted earlier, strategy directs the attention of 
decision makers. An entrepreneurial strategy is thought 
to focus attention on the output environment. Thus, an 
entrepreneurial strategy likely would be ineffective in 
countering internal causes of decline. Instead, because 
the inherent problem associated with internal factors is 
inefficiency (Robbins & Pearce, 1992), an efficiency 
strategy with its internal focus would be more successful. 
Hence, the following relationship is predicted:
Hypothesis 2b: To the extent that an 
organization's decline is related to internal 
factors, an efficiency strategy will lead to 
positive turnaround performance.
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Output-environmental causes of decline. The
exportation of products is the mechanism that allows for 
continued importation of new energy (Katz & Kahn, 1966). 
Thus, changes in the output environment that threaten the 
ability of the organization to export its products to the 
environment can lead to declining performance. Indeed, 
changes in the output environment (e.g., declining demand) 
are often threats to organizational survival (Harrigan, 
1980; Zammuto & Cameron, 1985) .
To the extent that a cause of decline originated in 
the output environment, an efficiency strategy misdirects 
management's attention to internal production and 
coordination systems and the input-environment. Hence, 
the misdirected focus of an efficiency strategy may be 
lethal.
On the other hand, an entrepreneurial strategy 
focuses management's attention on the output environment, 
and the changes that organizations need to make. 
Organizations with an external orientation are better able 
to respond to competitors (Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993). 
Changes in product demand and product users (i.e., output- 
environment factors) drive changes in an organization's 
strategic orientation (the business the organization is in 
and the method with which it competes) if the organization 
is to survive (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) . Thus, 
declining performance caused by output-environment factors
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should be countered with an entrepreneurial strategy.
Hence, the following relationship is predicted:
Hypothesis 2c: To the extent that an 
organization's decline is related to output- 
environmental factors, an entrepreneurial 
strategy will lead to positive turnaround 
performance.
Summary
This chapter developed a model of turnaround 
performance and accompanying propositions and hypotheses. 
The first section focused on developing the positive 
performance implications of strategy content and process 
fit. The second section focused on developing the 
positive performance implications of fitting the 
turnaround strategies to the cause of decline. An 
efficiency strategy is appropriate for addressing 
performance declines caused by either input-environmental 
factors or internal factors. In contrast, an 
entrepreneurial strategy is appropriate for addressing 
performance declines caused by output-environmental 
factors. The predictions articulated in this chapter were 
tested using the methodology outlined in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD
In this chapter, the research design used to test the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 is described. This 
chapter is organized as follows. First, the sample and 
data sources are described. Then, descriptions of the 
measures used and the data collection procedures are 
presented. Finally, the statistical analyses used to 
examine the hypotheses are detailed.
At several points during this research, experts, both 
practitioners and academics, were consulted to help 
address important methodological issues. These 
interactions are detailed where appropriate.
Sample and Data
Organizations in a single industry were chosen as the 
setting for this study. Several considerations underlay 
this choice. First, the restriction to a single industry 
ensured that industry effects on firm-level performance 
were not confused with the performance effects of interest 
(Dess, Ireland & Hitt, 1990). Second, it was desirable to 
examine a setting in which: 1) reliable and longitudinal 
data were available; and, 2) appropriate measures could be 
found for all modeled constructs. Given these 
requirements, the hospital industry was selected.
Before 1983, third-party payers reimbursed hospitals 
for the full costs of patient care from third-party 
payers. However, legislation limiting reimbursements to
53
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hospitals (i.e., the Medicare Prospective Payment System) 
was fully implemented in 1986. Over an extended period, 
the impact of this legislation was a dramatic downward 
shift in profitability (Guterman & Dobson, 1986). Thus, 
besides available, reliable and longitudinal data, there 
is evidence that this industry experienced major 
environmental changes which resulted in declining 
performance for many incumbents (Johnson & Johnson, 19 86; 
Shortell, Morrison & Friedman, 1990).
Drawing a sample from the entire hospital industry 
was not feasible due to the costs and other practical 
concerns (e.g., likelihood of obtaining responses).
Hence, the sample was drawn from the 325 hospitals owned 
by Columbia/HCA. Columbia/HCA is the largest U.S. 
hospital system (Lutz, 1995) and twelfth-largest employer 
in the United States (Lutz, 1994) . Columbia/HCA was 
chosen because of its size and multi-state distribution of 
hospitals.
The sample of declining hospitals was selected from 
between the years of 1988-1991. These years were selected 
because they were the most recent years from which to 
obtain a sample yet allow sufficient time to observe 
performance turnaround. Performance data was collected 
through 1994 (the most recent archival data available). 
Since the average time for an organization to turnaround 
is three years (Hoffman, 1989), it is reasonable to assume
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that this period is sufficient to observe the performance 
implications of strategic responses.
As noted in Chapter 1, organizational decline is 
defined as decreasing internal resources (Cameron, Sutton 
& Whetten, 1988). Thus, to be included in this sample, 
hospitals experienced: 1) a return on assets (ROA) of less 
than the risk-free rate of return for at least two 
continuous years; and, 2) at least one year of net loss.
The first criterion ensured that each hospital's poor 
performance was over an extended period, and not a one- 
year aberration. As noted in Chapter 2, organizations not 
producing returns that are at least equal to the risk- 
adjusted rate of return are failing in an economic sense 
(Porter, 1980). Since the risk-adjusted rate of return is 
higher, the risk-free rate served as a conservative 
criterion for sample inclusion (Barker, 1992) . The second 
criterion ensured that each hospital had, in fact, 
experienced a reduction of resources. A net loss 
fundamentally represents an organization's inability to 
recoup all the costs of producing its services and, thus, 
reflects declining internal resources (Barker, 1992). To 
ensure that these criteria were consistent with those used 
by practitioners, three hospital executives were 
consulted. The three executives concurred with these 
criteria. Of the 325 hospitals owned by Columbia/HCA, 131 
met the guidelines for inclusion in the sample.
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Archival data was collected for the years 19 87-1994.
It was obtained from the Center for Healthcare Industry 
Performance Studies (CHIPS), and the American Hospital 
Association's annual Guide to the Health Care Field (AHA 
Guide) . Primary data was obtained through questionnaires 
distributed to a top manager from each hospital.
Measures
Four control variables were measured beyond the 
variables corresponding to constructs in the model. The 
discussion of these control variables is followed by 
discussions of the independent and dependent measures. To 
help ensure the validity of the archival measures, a panel 
of three researchers, who specialize in health care 
issues, and a former hospital consultant reviewed the 
archival measures for face validity. Tables 4-1, 4-2, 4- 
3, 4-4, and 4-5 list the measures and data sources for 
each variable in the study.
Control variables. Three control variables relating 
to organizational characteristics specific to the hospital 
industry and one control variable required by the sampling 
method were used in this study. First, there are three 
organizational characteristics that have been found to 
predict hospital performance including: 1) size (Molinari, 
Morlock, Alexander & Lyles, 1993; Ozcan & Luke, 1993); 2) 
outpatient service mix (Goes & Zhan, 1995); and, 3)
Medicare and Medicaid intensity (Goes & Zhan, 1995) .
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These organizational characteristics were included in the 
study to control for their potential confounding effects.
As shown in Table 4-1, this study measured size as 
number of hospital beds. The number of beds is a well- 
established, widely-accepted measure of size (e.g., 
Alexander & Amburgey, 1987; Ginn, 1990; Provan, 1991) that 
is robust across locations (e.g., rural or metropolitan). 
Outpatient service mix was measured as the ratio of 
outpatient revenues to total revenues. Medicare and 
Medicaid intensity was measured as the percent of total 












CHIPSOutpatient Service Ratio of outpatient
Mix revenues to total revenues
Medicare and Ratio of Medicare and CHIPS
Medicaid Intensity Medicaid hospital days to
total hospital days
Prior Performance ROA in the third year prior CHIPS
to the year of sample 
inclusion
Besides the organizational characteristics discussed 
previously, this study also accounted for the potential 
performance effects of the extent and length of decline by 
accounting for the organization's prior performance. As
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noted previously, the criteria for sample inclusion 
ensured that an organization's poor performance was over 
an extended period, and that the organization experienced 
a reduction of resources. However, these criteria did not 
preclude varied lengths of decline. For example, an 
organization may have experienced multiple years of sub 
risk-free ROA before having one year of negative profit or 
may have had poor performance before 1988. Ideally, the 
number of years a hospital was in decline could be 
measured and included as a control variable. However, 
this was precluded because performance data prior to 1987 
was unavailable from CHIPS and there was no other suitable 
source for this data. Thus, instead of directly measuring 
the length of decline, this study included the 
organization's ROA in the third year prior to the year of 
sample inclusion as a control variable. Although this 
control variable is probably less accurate than the number 
of years a hospital was in decline, this variable 
indicates if the hospital was in decline as well as the 
extent of that decline prior to sample inclusion.
Strategy Content. Strategy content was measured with 
the weighted change in service offerings and change in the 
routine days percentage. The weighted change in service 
offerings was computed using a system developed by 
Hambrick (19 81) and has been used in several other 
hospital industry studies (e.g., Ketchen, Thomas &
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McDaniel, 1996; Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993; Thomas & 
McDaniel, 1990). A list of services offered by individual 
hospitals is printed annually in the AHA Guide. Using 
this list, a profile of changes in product/service 
offerings between the year of and three years after sample 
inclusion was compiled for each hospital. A high adoption 
of new service offerings indicates that the hospital added 
new products and services and, thus, adopted an 
entrepreneurial strategy. Conversely, a low score on this 
measure indicates that the hospital did not adopt new 
service offerings and, instead, adopted an efficiency 
strategy.
Table 4-2
Operationalization of Strategy Content
DATA
VARIABLE MEASURE SOURCE
Turnaround Weighted change in AHA Guide
Strategy service offerings
Change in routine days CHIPS
percentage
The second measure of strategy content is the change 
in routine patient days as a percentage of total patient 
days (Ketchen, Thomas & Snow, 1993). Hospital services 
can be categorized as routine (e.g., radiology, pharmacy) 
or nonroutine (e.g., neonatal and burn care units). 
Hospitals seeking to exploit new service opportunities 
have a relatively large percentage of patients in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 0
nonroutine service units (Shortell, Morrison & Freidman, 
1990). In contrast, hospitals focusing on efficiency 
ignore the opportunities presented by nonroutine services, 
and instead concentrate on offering routine services 
efficiently (Meyer, 1982). A decreasing ratio of routine 
to total days indicates that a hospital added or 
emphasized nonroutine services and, thus, adopted an 
entrepreneurial strategy. In contrast, a stable or 
increasing ratio indicates that a hospital emphasized 
efficiency in its current services rather than service 
innovations. Thus, a stable or increasing ratio indicates 
an efficiency strategy.
Strategy process. Averaged five-point Likert scale 
responses are the measures of strategy process variables 
(see Table 4-3). The scale to measure centralization of 
decision making was adapted from the scales used by 
Inkson, Pugh and Hickson (19 70) and Thomas and McDaniel 
(1990). Originally, the centralization of decision making 
scale consisted of six items; however, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, the scale was reduced to four items because of 
low loadings in the confirmatory factor analysis.
A scale to measure information usage was not 
available. Thus, a new scale was developed. Items were 
validated by the practitioners with which the
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questionnaire was pretested. The information usage scale 
consisted of fifteen items.
Table 4-3 
Operationalization of Strategy Process
VARIABLE MEASURE DATA SOURCE
Information Average of Likert Questionnaire
Usage scale responses
Centraliza- Average of Likert Questionnaire
tion of scale responses
Decision
Making
Cause of decline. Because using archival data is 
more valid than using perceptual data when a study's 
objective is understanding the outcomes of strategic 
actions (Boyd, Dess & Rasheed, 1993), archival measures 
were used to assess the cause of decline. The measure of 
input-environmental causes of decline was the ratio of 
salary per full-time employee (FTE) as compared to the 
Columbia/HCA average. If skilled employees are relatively 
scarce, then the hospital would have to pay more to 
attract them than the other hospitals in the system (Nutt 
& Milter, 1992); thus, a ratio higher than the system's 
average would indicate scarce employee resources in that 
hospital's location. To eliminate the impact of regional 
wage differences, this ratio was adjusted by the regional 
wage index. This variable, as well as the other cause-of- 
decline variables, was averaged over the years that the
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organizations met the selection criteria for sample 
inclusion.
Table 4-4
Operationalization of Cause of Decline
VARIABLE MEASURE
Input-Environmental Salary per FTE (adjusted 
Cause of Decline by wage index) / Columbia -
HCA average





Length of stays (adjusted 
for case mix) / Columbia- 
HCA average







Internal causes of decline were represented by the 
length of stay compared to Columbia/HCA average. Length 
of stay is the number of days the average patient is 
hospitalized and is a measure of efficiency (Goes & Meyer 
1990). The more efficient a hospital is in providing 
medical care, the shorter the length of stay (Ketchen, 
Thomas & Snow, 1993) . Thus, the extent to which this 
ratio exceeds Columbia/HCA average indicates the extent tc 
which the hospital suffered from internal causes of 
decline. This measure was adjusted for case mix to 
eliminate differences among hospitals regarding the 
severity of illness treated.
The measure selected to represent output - 
environmental causes of decline was change in county 
market share. The county is a widely-used measure of a
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hospital market area (Garnick, Luft, Robinson & Tetreault, 
19 87) The change was measured between the year prior to 
and the year of sample inclusion. A declining market 
share may suggest the presence of a new competitor, the 
addition of new services by a competitor. Whatever the 
specific underlying reason, a declining market share 
fundamentally represents that the hospital1s services are 
less desirable than those of competitors; thus, a 
declining market share represents an output-environmental 
cause of decline.
Turnaround performance. The most complex construct 
in this study is performance. As noted in Chapter 2, 
performance is a multidimensional construct that can be 
conceptualized in terms of financial, operational, or 
effectiveness outcomes (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986) . 
Because performance is a multidimensional construct, the 
dimensions should exhibit divergent validity (i.e., the 
three dimensions should be distinct) as well as convergent 
construct validity (i.e., there should be correspondence 
among the three dimensions) . Thus, it is generally 
believed that the multiple dimensions of performance 
should be examined in the same study, so that divergence 
and convergence can be examined (Cameron, 1986;
Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).
This study did indeed examine all three dimensions of 
performance. The effectiveness outcomes were obtained
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with the use of questionnaires. The respondents were 
asked to respond in a five-point Likert scale format to 
two questions about the overall performance of the 
hospital (See Appendix). The responses to the two 
questions were averaged to obtain a measure of the 
effectiveness outcome for each hospital. Operating
performance was measured with the hospital occupancy rate. 
Occupancy reflects the extent to which a hospital presents 
an attractive bundle of characteristics to admitting 
physicians and potential patients (Ketchen, Thomas & Snow, 
1993; Molinari, Morlock, Alexander & Lyles, 1993) and, 
thus, serves as a measure of operating performance. 
Financial performance was measured in this study with ROA, 
which is a widely-used financial performance measure in 
studies of hospitals (e.g., Clement, D'Aunno & Poyzer,
1993; Cleverley & Harvey, 1992; Molinari, Morlock, 
Alexander & Lyles, 1993).
As shown in Table 4-5, the operational and financial 
performance indicators were measured in two ways. First, 
these indicators were averaged over a three-year period 
that began one year after the year during which the 
hospital qualified for inclusion in the sample. Second, 
these indicators were measured during the third year after 
the year during which the hospital qualified for inclusion 
in the sample.
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Organizational performance was measured in the first 
way (i.e., 3-year average) because averaging prevents one- 
year outliers from producing spurious results (Thomas,
Clark Sc Gioia, 1993) . Measuring performance in the second 
way (i.e., the third year only) gives an indication of the 
long-term success of the organization's strategy. It is 
conceptually different from the first method because it is 
not affected by large write-offs and losses that may 
happen in the first year of the turnaround (cf. Robbins & 
Pearce, 1992). Thus, this measure attempts to parcel out 
any retrenchment expenses by examining performance in only 





Effectiveness Average of Likert-scale Survey
Performance responses
Operational Three-year average occupancy CHIPS
Performance Occupancy in third year CHIPS
Financial Three-year average ROA CHIPS
Performance ROA in third year CHIPS
The choice of three years was based on a summary of 
past turnaround studies that indicated organizations take 
three years on average to achieve turnaround (Hoffman, 
1989). Further, a relatively short period was necessary 
to minimize potential history threats (i.e., performance 
effects of events unrelated to the turnaround strategies -
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- Cook & Campbell, 1979). Finally, a longer period likely 
would have increased retrospective errors (i.e., 
misreporting past events or behaviors -- Golden, 1992). 
Thus, three years appeared to be a prudent time frame.
Data Collection Procedures
The measures of strategy process and effectiveness 
performance were obtained via a mailed questionnaire. The 
content validity and reliability of these scale items were 
established using a retranslation exercise (Russell & 
Russell, 1992; Smith & Kendall, 1963). In this exercise, 
a panel of nine doctoral graduate students sorted 
individual scale items into piles representing the 
variables. As a result of this exercise, one item was 
removed from the questionnaire because it was not 
consistently sorted into the "correct" pile. The 
remaining questions were sorted into the "correct" piles 
(i.e., at least eight of the nine students sorted the 
remaining questions into the "correct" pile). Thus, the 
construct validity and reliability of the scale items were 
demonstrated.
The construction of the questionnaire and associated 
materials (i.e., cover letters and envelopes) was guided 
by Dillman's (1978) total design method. Dillman and 
associates' specific and empirically-supported 
recommendations were designed to maximize both the 
validity of the survey questions and the response rate.
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Based on the effectiveness of the total design method (cf. 
Snow & Thomas, 1994), Dillman's (1978) methods guided 
activities throughout the survey process.
Dillman's (1978) method specifies that questionnaires 
be pilot tested with three types of individuals 
(academics, practitioners in the industry of interest, and 
industry experts). Based on this suggestion, the 
questionnaire for the present study was pilot tested with 
four researchers, four hospital executives, and three 
industry experts.
An initial mailing (including a personalized cover 
letter, questionnaire, and stamped return envelope) was 
followed in one week by a reminder postcard. Two weeks 
later, a second mailing was sent to those managers not 
responding to the first. Four weeks, later, a set of 
questionnaires was sent via a facsimile machine. A fourth 
mailing, which included a personalized cover letter from a 
Columbia/HCA hospital CEO, was sent out sixteen weeks 
after the original mailing. Copies of the cover letters 
and questionnaire are included in the Appendix.
To establish the reliability and discriminant 
validity of the variables measured by the survey, all 
scale items were analyzed using confirmatory factor 
analysis. The results were examined to: 1) ensure that 
the scale items were significantly related to their 
specified constructs; 2) assess the reliability of the
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measures; and, 3) establish discriminant validity of the 
variables. Results of this confirmatory factor analysis 
are presented in Chapter 5.
Another concern was the use of retrospective 
accounts. Individuals may attempt to project a socially- 
desirable image by trying to present their past decisions 
as rational (Feldman & March, 1981; Salancik & Meindl,
19 84). Further, respondents may unintentionally represent 
the past due to "hindsight" bias (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975) 
or as an attempt to maintain their self-esteem (Huber & 
Power, 19 85). Notably, the recall by respondents in 
organizations that have changed strategies is less 
accurate than recall by respondents in organizations that 
have not changed strategies. Thus, retrospective errors 
(i.e., misreporting the past -- Golden, 1992) are 
especially pertinent threats to the validity of the survey 
responses for this study. Hence, attempts were made to 
minimize these errors.
First, the survey was designed to ask about specific 
facts or behaviors, rather than general assessments of the 
hospitals' past strategies. Accounts of past facts and 
behaviors are likely to be more accurate than accounts of 
past beliefs and intentions (Golden, 1992). Further, the 
cover letter attempted to motivate managers to provide 
accurate information by stressing the value of this 
research to their company and themselves. Additionally,
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the survey included a customized financial summary of the 
years 1988 - 1994. Furnishing a financial summary with 
the questionnaire helps focus the respondents' attention 
to a specific time (Robbins & Pearce, 1992). The items 
included on the financial summary were validated by the 
hospital executives who pretested the survey as those 
items most likely to focus the respondent's attention on 
the appropriate time frame.
Hypotheses Testing
As noted in Chapter 2, the theoretical basis of this 
study is strategic choice (Child, 1972), which is a 
descendant of contingency theory (Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 
1985). Contingency theory asserts that there is an 
interaction between two or more variables that predicts a 
third variable (Schoonhoven, 1981). Thus, the statistical 
tests for these hypotheses must be capable of detecting 
interactions. Specifically, hypotheses la, lb, lc and Id 
predict an interaction between strategy content and 
process variables, and hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c predict an 
interaction between strategy content and cause of decline. 
Because these hypotheses specify a particular criterion 
(i.e., turnaround performance) and are precise in their 
specification of the functional form (i.e., interaction 
between strategy content and process, and interaction 
between strategy content and cause of decline) , moderated 
multiple regression analysis (MMR)is the appropriate
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statistical test (Venkatraman, 1989) . MMR is the most 
powerful technique to detect the presence of a moderator 
relationship (Stone, 1988). Because turnaround 
performance is measured using multiple variables, 
multivariate moderated multiple regression (MMMR) is 
appropriate (Johnson & Wichern, 1988) .
MMMR requires that a two-step process be followed.
In the first step, only the control variables and the main 
effects are entered into the regression equation. In the 
second step, the interaction terms are added into the 
equation. If a statistically significant difference in 
explanatory power is found (i.e., change in R‘) , then an 
interaction has been noted.
Summary
This chapter outlined the sample, data sources, 
measures, and research design used in this study. Chapter 
5 presents the results of the analyses.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
This chapter is organized into three parts. First, 
the results of the primary data collection are described. 
Second, descriptive statistics (means, standard 
deviations, and Pearson zero-order correlations) for all 
variables used in the study are presented. Finally, the 
results of the analyses used to examine each hypothesis 
developed in Chapter 4 are detailed.
Primary Data Collection
Responses were received from 77 or 58.8% of the 131 
hospitals surveyed. However, ten organizations responded 
that no current managers had been at the hospital for a 
sufficient amount of time to complete the questionnaire. 
Further, one response was unusable because the top manager 
failed to complete substantial portions of the survey. 
Thus, the number of organizations represented by usable 
responses was 66, or 50.4%, which compares very favorably 
to the 12% response rate typically obtained when surveying 
top managers (Hambrick, Geletkanycz & Fredrickson, 1993). 
Certain hospitals were represented by multiple responses; 
thus, the total number of surveys received from the 66 
hospitals was 80. Because the goal of the confirmatory 
factor analysis was to examine the reliability of and 
variance extracted by the scale items, rather than analyze 
the organization, all 80 surveys were used in the 
confirmatory factor analysis. However, the unit of
71
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analysis in the remaining analyses is the organization. 
Thus, the questionnaire completed by the highest-level 
manager was selected to represent the organization. This 
decision rule was deemed appropriate because higher-level 
managers have the best understanding of an entire 
organization (Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980) , and, thus, would 
have the most knowledge of an organization's strategy 
processes and performance. In the event that the 
questionnaires were completed by managers at equal levels, 
the questionnaire used was selected randomly.
Description of respondents. Of the 66 usable 
responses, 37 (56%) were completed by chief executive 
officers, 19 (29%) were completed by chief operating 
officers or chief financial officers, and 6 surveys (9%) 
were completed by other managers (e.g., assistant 
administrator, chief nursing officer). The remaining 4 
surveys (6%) did not identify which manager completed 
them. To assess if there were any significant differences 
in responses across these groups of respondents, the mean 
responses were analyzed with multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA). The results reflected no significant 
differences in reported information usage (F=l.39, p<.25), 
centralization (F=1.02, p<.39) and effectiveness 
performance (F=.05, p<.98). Because there were no obvious 
differences in responses, no further controls for
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differences in organizational level of the respondents 
were deemed necessary.
The respondents, averaging 45 years of age, had been 
at their hospital an average of 8.2 years and had an 
average of 18 years of experience in the hospital 
industry. Operations /management was identified by 54.5% 
of the respondents as their primary area of expertise. 
Accounting/finance, clinical, and marketing were 
identified by 16.7%, 4.5%, and 3.0% respectively.
Multiple areas were identified by 16.7%, and 4.6% did not 
identify any areas of expertise.
Test for non-response bias. The extent to which the 
66 respondents represented the total sample of 131 was a 
major concern. Accordingly, T-tests were used for 
comparison in terms of important hospital demographic 
variables. Also, because one might expect that successful 
hospitals would be more likely to respond, respondents and 
nonrespondents were compared based on subsequent 
performance. As shown in Table 5-1, the results of these 
tests indicate that those hospitals which did respond do 
not appear significantly different from those which did 
not. Thus, the hospitals from which responses were 
received appear to be representative of all the hospitals 
that were sent a questionnaire.
Reliability and variance extracted. A survey was 
used to gather data on three variables (i.e.,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 5-1






t = .3324 
(P < .74)
2. Outpatient revenue as a 
percentage o f total revenue
Mean 23.79
Standard Deviation 7.53
t = .6451 
(P < .52)
3. Medicare and Medicaid revenue 
as a percentage o f total revenue
Mean 60.48
Standard Deviation 13.62




t = .39 
(p < .70)
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Respondents Non-Respondents
Dimension (n=66)  fn=65)
5. ROA averaged over 3 years after 
sample inclusion
Mean -.51 -3.85
Standard Deviation 11.25 24.76
t =  1.0 
(P < 32)
6 . Occupancy in third year 
after sample inclusion
Mean .63 .63
Standard Deviation .15 .18
t = .05 
(P < .96)
7. Occupancy averaged over 
three years after sample 
inclusion
Mean .62 .63
Standard Deviation .13 .16
t = . 19 
(p < .85)
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centralization of decision making, information usage, and 
performance). The scale items representing the variables 
were analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis. The 
results were examined to: l) ensure that the scale items 
were significantly related to their specified constructs;
2) assess the reliability of the measures; and, 3) assess 
discriminant validity among the variables.
The correlations among the scale items for 
centralization of decision making and performance, and the 
average of the information usage items were analyzed with 
confirmatory factor analysis. Because there was a sole 
indicator for information usage, reliability estimates 
were used to fix measurement parameters (cf. Williams & 
Hazer, 1986). Specifically, the information usage 
construct's path to its indicator was set equal to the 
square root of the indicator's composite latent 
reliability, which was computed with the sums of 
standardized loadings and indicator measurement errors 
derived from the confirmatory factor analysis ran with all 
fifteen items (Q3 items 1-15) loading on one construct.
The reliability of the fifteen items was .825; thus the 
path was set equal to .908. The indicator's measurement 
error was set to one minus the reliability (.175).
A Heywood case was noted when examining the 
measurement model results. Q8.1 had a loading of 1.05; 
thus, before the overall fit of the model could be
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assessed, the measurement error for q8.1 was set to a 
small value (.005) to correct the offending estimate 
(Hair, et al., 1992). The overall fit of the model to the 
data was satisfactory. The x' was 10.85 and 
nonsignificant (p=.62, 13 df) ; however, this measure of 
fit may not be reliable with sample sizes smaller than 100 
(Hair, et al. 1992) . Thus, other measures of fit were 
examined. These alternative measures indicated support 
for an adequate overall fit of the model. Bentler's 
(1990) comparative fit index was 1.0, Bollen's (1989) 
incremental fit index was 1.0, Jorskog and Sorbom's (1993) 
goodness of fit index was .96, Tucker and Lewis' (1973) 
fit index was 1.0, and the normed fit index (Bentler & 
Bonett, 1990) was .94. The model fit was further 
evaluated by testing whether any of the three hypothesized 
factors could be combined without significantly affecting 
the fit of the model. The results suggested that the 
three factor model fit the data significantly better than 
any rival model.
As shown in the Table 5-2, the reliability of and 
amount of variance extracted by the items for each 
construct were satisfactory. Although the reliability of 
the performance construct may be slightly inflated because 
the respecification of the measurement error for q8 .1 
(Hair et al., 1992), the reliability of the items 
comprising centralization of decision making and
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performance far exceeded the recommended level of .70 
(Nunnally, 1978), measuring .84 and .82 respectively. The 
variance extracted for these same measures exceeds the 
recommended .50 level (Hair et al., 1992). The variance 
extracted totaled .57 for centralization of decision 
making and .59 for performance. The correlation between 
factors was significant only between centralization of 
decision making and information usage (r=.431, t=3.76, 
p<.001). The correlations between performance and 
centralization of decision making, and performance and 
information usage were nonsignificant (r=.179, t=1.496; 
and r=-.01 t=-.10 respectively).
Descriptive Statistics
Table 5-3 presents the means, standard deviations, 
and Pearson zero-order correlations among the control, 
strategy content and process, cause of decline, and 
performance variables.
Testing of Hypotheses
Tables 5-4 through 5-9 summarize the regression 
results. As noted in Chapter 4, two measures of 
turnaround strategy (weighted change in strategy offerings 
and change in routine days percentage) were obtained. The 
goal of obtaining two measures of strategy was to ensure 
the findings were robust across measures of strategy 
(Jick, 1979). Thus, the hypotheses were tested using the


















Completely Standardized Confirmatory Factor Loadings
Item # Item Centralization Info Usage Performance
2.2 did all members of the hospital's top management
make strategic decisions on a regular basis?
2.3 was authority for making strategic decisions shared
by all top managers?
2.5 did all top managers share responsibility for strategic decisions?




3.15 information usage .908
8.1 the effectiveness o f your hospitals response to the financial decline .997
8.2 the current performance of your hospital .648






measures of strategy consecutively. Tables 5-4 through 5- 
6 show the regression results when using the weighted 
change in service offerings as the measure of strategy. 
Tables 5-7 through 5-9 show the regression results when 
using the change in routine days percentage as the measure 
of strategy. Comparing Equations l and 2 for all 
performance measures allows examination of the hypotheses. 
Equation 1 includes the control variables and the main 
effects of the strategy process and content, and cause of 
decline variables. Equation 2 includes these same 
variables and the interactions among these variables. In 
all cases, the change in R~ after adding the interaction 
effects was nonsignificant. Thus, there was no support 
for the presence of interactions (Jaccard, Turrisi & Wan, 
199 0), and no support for the hypotheses developed in this 
study.
Multicollinearity is often found among variables when 
multiplicative terms are used to represent interaction 
effects (Jaccard, Turrisi & Wan, 1990). If present, 
multicollinearity can distort the results or make the 
results unstable (Hair et al., 1992). Thus, the impact of 
multicollinearity was assessed using a procedure outlined 
in Hair et al (1992). First, all condition indices 
(ameasure of the relative amount of variance associated 
with an eigenvalue, such that larger values indicate high
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 5-3 
Descriptive Statistics (IXS66)1
Variables Mean S.D. I 2 3
Control Variables
1. Size





3. Medicare and 
Medicaid Intensity 60.48 13.62 -.40 .19
4. Prior Performance 1.52 8.22 -.10 .19 .13
Strategy Content
5. Weighted Change 
in Service Offerings 24.58 19.13 -».J J -.10  -.06
6 . Change in Routine Days -1.30 2.69 -.05 .04 .07
Strategy Process
7. Information Usage 3.25 .52 .10 -.13 -.11
8 . Centralization of 
Decision Making 3.53 .81 .15 .06 -.18
Cause of Decline
9. Input - Environmental 
Cause o f Decline 1.03 .11 -.12 -.02 -.09
10. Internal Cause of 
Decline 1.04 .18 .04 -.02 .22
11. Output - Environmental 
Cause o f Decline .99 .11 .01 .20 -.10
Performance
12. Effectiveness Performance 4.15 .77 -.12 .10 .04
13. Three-year Average 
Occupancy 44.23 10.96 .27 -.24 -.06
14. Occupancy in 
Third Year 44.99 10.74 y -y. J J -.35 -.14
15. Three-year 
Average ROA -.51 11.25 -.08 .23 -.04
16. ROA in third vear 3.06 12.4 .09 .27 -.11
'Correlations greater than | .241 are significant as p< 05; correlations greater than | . 
are significant at p< 01; correlations greater than J .391 are significant at p < 001 .
(table con'
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Variables 4 5 6 7 8
Control Variables
1. Size
2. Outpatient Service Mix





in Service Offerings -.09
6 . Change in Routine Days -.35 .20
Strategy Process
7. Information Usage -.06 -.14 .02
8 . Centralization o f
Decision Making .23 .19 .02 .27
Cause of Decline
9. Input - Environmental
Cause o f Decline -.04 -.16 .13 .09 .18
10. Internal Cause of
Decline -.23 -.04 .12 .17 -.20
11. Output - Environmental
Cause of Decline -.04 .17 .02 -.11 -.02
Performance
12. Effectiveness Performance .03 .12 .11 -.03 .16
13. Three-year Average
Occupancy -.26 .26 .24 .17 .09
14. Occupancy in
Third Year -.18 .23 .12 .23 .08
15. Three-year
Average ROA .02 .10 .08 -.18 .04
16. ROA in third year -.07 .14 .07 . 22 -.02
'Correlations greater than | .241 are significant as p<05; correlations greater than 
are significant at p<.01; correlations greater than j .391 are significant at p< 001.
(table con'd.)
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Variables 9 10 11 12 13
Control Variables
1. Size
2. Outpatient Service Mix




5. Weighted Change 
in Service Offerings
6 . Change in Routine Days
Strategy Process
7. Information Usage
8 . Centralization of 
Decision Making
Cause of Decline
9. Input - Environmental 
Cause o f Decline
10. Internal Cause of
Decline -.18
11. Output - Environmental
Cause o f Decline -.01 .04
Performance
12. Effectiveness Performance .11 -.03 .34
13. Three-year Average
Occupancy -.17 -.10 -.09 .01
14. Occupancy in
Third Year -.17 -.03 -.07 -.03 .91
15. Three-year
Average ROA .16 1 UJ O .12 .09 .10
16. ROA in third year -.14 -.21 .13 .00 .25
'Correlations greater than | .2 4 1 are significant as p<05; correlations greater than 
are significant at p< 01; correlations greater than | .39 [ are significant at p< 001.
(table con
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Variables 14 15 16
Control Variables
1. Size
2. Outpatient Service Mix




5. Weighted Change 
in Service Offerings
6 . Change in Routine Days
Strategy Process
7. Information Usage
8. Centralization o f 
Decision Making
Cause of Decline
9. Input - Environmental 
Cause o f Decline
10. Internal Cause of 
Decline




13. Three-year Average 
Occupancy




16. ROA in third year .18 .75
'Correlations greater than | .24 j are significant as p<05; correlations greater than | . 
are significant at p< 01: correlations greater than | .391 are significant at p<001.




Change In Service Offerings as Indicator 
of Strategy Content
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
Three Year ROA in
Equation
Size
Outpatient Service Mix 
Medicare/Medicaid Intensity 
Prior Performance
Change in Service Offerings
Information Usage 
Centralization
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline 
Internal Cause o f  Decline 
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline
Change in Service Offerings X 
Info Usage
Change in Service Offerings X 
Centralization
Change in Service Offerings X
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline
Change in Service Offerings X 
Internal Cause o f Decline
Change in Service Offerings X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline
Note: *p< 05; **p<0l; ***p< 001
Average ROA Third Year
I 2 1 2
.36* .36* .27 .26
jg** .40** .42** .41**
.11 .15 .03 .02
-.09 -.13 -.18 -.22
.03 .08 .04 3.09
-.10 .15 -.13 .11
i o -j -.01 -.06 .04
.19 .05 -.12 -.15
-.32* -.38 -.26 -.14
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uation 1 2 1 2
df (10,55) (15,50) (10,55) (15,50)
Adjusted R2 .13 .10 .13 .10
R2 .26 .31 .27 .31
F 1.99* 1.47 1.93 1.50
Change in R2 .05 .04
F .73 .58




Change in Service Offerings as Indicator 
of Strategy Content
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
Three Year Occupancy in
Average Occupancy Third Year
Equation I 2 1 2
Size






























Input-Environmental Cause of Decline 
Internal Cause o f Decline 













Change in Service Offerings X 
Info Usage -.07 .12
Change in Service Offerings X 
Centralization 1.07 1.35
Change in Service Offerings X
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline .54 .91
Change in Service Offerings X
Internal Cause o f Decline -.17 .21
Change in Service Offerings X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline -.21 .22
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
( t a b l e c o n 1' d . )








df (10,55) (15,50) (10.55) (15,50)
Adjusted R2 .15 .13 .14 .14
R2 .28 ■*» .27 .34
F 2.16* 1.65 2 .0 2 * 1.70
Change in R2 .05 07
F 1.19 1.04
Note: *p<.05; **p<01; ***p<.001
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Table 5-6 
Regression Results 
Change in Service Offerings as Indicator 
of Strategy Content
Independent Variables Dependent Variable
Performance
Equation _1 2
Size -.20  -.14
Outpatient Service Mix -.08 -.10
Medicare/Medicaid Intensity .05 .03
Prior Performance .00 .12
Change in Service Offerings .10 3.91
Information Usage -.01 -.05
Centralization .20 .19
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline .08 .03
Internal Cause o f Decline .01 .24
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline .35** 9 5 **
Change in Service Offerings X
Info Usage .15
Change in Service Offerings X 
Centralization .10
Change in Service Offerings X
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline . 12
Change in Service Offerings X
Internal Cause o f Decline -.69
Change in Service Offerings X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline -3 .68
Note: *p<05; **p<01; ***p<001
(table con'd.)






Adjusted R2 .04 .05
R2 .19 .27
F 1.27 1.23
Change in R2 .08
F 1.12
Note: *p<05; **p<.0l; ***p<.001




Change in Routine Days as Indicator o£ Strategy Content
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
Three Year ROA in
Average ROA Third Year
Equation I 2 1 2
Size






























Input-Environmental Cause of Decline 
Internal Cause o f Decline 













Change in Routine Days X 
Info Usage .39 1.34
Change in Routine Days X 
Centralization .11 -.64
Change in Routine Days X
Input-Environmental Cause of Decline 1.38 .39
Change in Routine Days X 
Internal Cause o f Decline -.50 -2 . 11*
Change in Routine Days X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline 1.46 1.85
Note: *p<05; **p< 01; ***p<001
(table con'd.)








df (10,55) (15,55) (10,55) (15,55)
Adjusted R2 .14 .10 .13 .18
R2 .27 .31 .26 .37
F 2.03* 1.50 1.95 1.98*
Change in R2 .04 .06
F .60 1.75
Note: *p<05; **p<0 l; ***p<001




Change in Routine Days as Indicator of Strategy Content
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
Three Year Occupancy in
Average Occupancy Third Year
Equation 1 2 1 2
Size .19 .14 .17 .07
Outpatient Service Mix -.12 -.16 -.24 -.27
Medicare/Medicaid Intensity .12 .10 .03 -.01
Prior Performance -.25 -.36* -.11 -.24
Change in Routine Days .22 1.52 .13 -.08
Information Usage .17 .17 .21 .28
Centralization .09 .13 .05 .06
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline -.26* -.32* -.23 -.30*
Internal Cause o f Decline -.27* -.34 -.16 -.29
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline -.04 .03 -.01 .12
Change in Routine Days X
Info Usage .17 1.29
Change in Routine Days X
Centralization .13 -.28
Change in Routine Days X
Input-Environmental Cause o f  Decline -2.44 -2.50
Change in Routine Days X
Internal Cause o f Decline -.59 -.90
Change in Routine Days X
Output-Environmental Cause o f  Decline 1.11 2.55*
Note: *p< 05: **p< 01; ***p< 001
(table con'd.)
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Dependent Variables
Three Year Occupancy in
Average Occupancy Third Year
Equation 1 2  1 2
df (10,55) (15,50) (10,55) (15,50)
Adjusted R2 .18 .19 .13 .19
R2 .30 .37 .26 .37
F 2.38* 2.01* 1.97 1.98*
Change in R2 .07 .11
F 1.18 1.75
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001









Outpatient Service Mix -.09 -.08
Medicare/Medicaid Intensity .05 .00
Prior Performance .02 -1.04
Change in Routine Days .09 - 1.00
Information Usage -.03 -.02
Centralization .19 .23
Input-Environmental Cause of Decline .05 .02
Internal Cause o f  Decline -.01 .07
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline .37** .39**
Change in Routine Days X
Info Usage .98
Change in Routine Days X 
Centralization .27
Change in Routine Days X
Input-Environmental Cause o f Decline -1.50
Change in Routine Days X
Internal Cause o f Decline .52
Change in Routine Days X
Output-Environmental Cause o f Decline .82
Note: *p<05;**p<0l;***p<001
(table con'd.)





Adjusted R2 .04 -.02
R2 .19 .22
F 1.26 .93
Change in R2 .03
F .39
Note: *p< 05;**p<01;***p< 001
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collinearity -- Hair et al., 1992) greater than 15 were 
identified. Then for all the condition indices greater 
than 15, variables with variance proportions greater than 
50 percent were identified. This analysis did not 
identify any condition indices where a substantial 
proportion of the variance was explained for multiple 
coefficients. Thus, multicollinearity does not appear to 
have had a significant impact on these results, 
further ensure that the impact of multicollinearity was 
minimal, the variables comprising the main effects (e.g., 
strategy process and content, and cause of decline) were 
centered prior to the formation of the multiplicative 
interaction terms (Cronbach, 1987) . The results of the 
regression analyses with the centered variables were not 
materially different from the results of the regressionTo 
analyses presented above. Thus, the impact of 
multicollinearity appears minimal.
Summary
This chapter presented the results of the primary 
data collection, the means, standard deviations, and 
Pearson zero-order correlations among the variables, and 
the results of the regression analyses. The measures 
gathered by primary data collection (i.e., information 
usage, centralization of decision making, and the 
effectiveness measure of performance) were shown to be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
reliable and valid. Nonetheless, the results of the 
regression analyses failed to support any of the 
hypotheses. In the next chapter, the results presented 
above are discussed.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This chapter reviews the study's results and 
discusses avenues for future research prompted by the 
results. First, the results of the hypotheses testing are 
discussed. Second, the limitations of this study are 
identified. Finally, several research opportunities are 
described.
Discussion of Results
This study posited that achieving two types of fit 
positively impacts turnaround performance. The first type 
of fit is between strategy content and strategy process, 
and the second type of fit is between strategy and cause 
of decline. However, the results of the study did not 
show that either type of fit impacted performance.
Although the notion that strategy content or strategy 
process individually impact turnaround performance was not 
formally hypothesized, past research has supported the 
relationship between strategy content and performance 
(e.g., Dess & Davis, 1984; Hrebiniak, Joyce Sc Snow, 1989; 
Rumelt, 1982) and strategy process and performance (e.g., 
Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Huff & Reger, 1987; Priem, Rasheed 
& Kotulic, 1985) . Nonetheless, the results of the study 
do not show a relationship between either strategy content 
or strategy process and turnaround performance. The 
following potential explanations for these results are 
discussed below: l) strategy is not crucial to an
99
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organization's ability to restore its performance; 2) the 
two types of fit are necessary, but not sufficient 
conditions for enhanced performance; 3) turnaround 
processes are too idiosyncratic to generalize; and, 4) 
alternative conceptualizations and statistical tests of 
fit may be more appropriate.
The first possibility is that the choice of strategy 
is not crucial because strategy may be only loosely 
coupled to performance. Loose coupling can result from 
the equifinality of strategies or causal independence 
(Weick, 1976). More specifically, the choice of strategy 
may not be important because both turnaround strategies 
are equally effective in resuscitating an organization's 
performance (i.e., equifinality may be operative -- 
Gresov, 1989; Mohr, 1982) . Previous research has found 
that more than one strategy may lead to high performance 
in a given situation; for example, different strategies 
may perform equally well if used in different industries 
(Hambrick, 1983), or if supported by appropriate 
distinctive competencies (Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980).
This study originally predicted the equifinality of 
turnaround strategies; both strategies were predicted to 
lead to high performance if matched to the appropriate 
cause of decline. Although the predicted equifinality 
resulting from matching strategy to the cause of decline 
was not supported, equifinality may still be operative.
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For example, variances in distinctive competencies (i.e., 
those things an organization does well in comparison to 
its competitors -- Selznick, 1957) might contribute to 
equifinality. Defender strategies (Miles & Snow, 1978) 
are successful when supported by competencies in financial 
management, production, and applied engineering, and 
prospector strategies (Miles & Snow, 1978) are successful 
when supported by competencies in product research and 
development, market research, and basic engineering (Snow 
and Hrebiniak, 1980) . The defender and efficiency 
turnaround strategies both strongly emphasize efficiency 
(Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Miles & Snow, 1978). Thus, the 
efficiency strategy may be successful if supported by some 
of the same competencies that support the defender 
strategy (e.g., financial management, service delivery, 
and engineering geared toward improving efficiency in 
service delivery). The prospector and entrepreneurial 
turnaround strategies both strongly emphasize product and 
market effectiveness (Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Miles &
Snow, 19 78). Hence, the entrepreneurial strategy may be 
successful if supported by the same competencies that 
support a prospector strategy (e.g., market research and 
new service development). Future research is needed to 
assess the role of supporting competencies in turnaround 
strategy equifinality.
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The other reason for the loose coupling between 
strategy and turnaround performance may be causal 
independence. Specifically, the strategic decisions of 
managers may not be related to performance; instead, the 
coercive forces of the environment may determine which 
organizations will turnaround and which organizations will 
fail (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984) . Population 
ecologists posit that individual organizations rarely 
succeed in making changes to their strategies (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984). Because of this inertia, the sources of 
the organization's decline will continue to exhibit 
downward pressure on performance. This study showed very 
modest support for this ecological line of thinking. Some 
of the cause of decline variables reflected a negative 
relationship with turnaround performance; in contrast, 
neither strategy content nor performance was significantly 
related to turnaround performance. Length of stay, an 
indicator of inefficiency, was negatively related to 
financial performance (see Tables 5-4 and 5-7) and 
occupancy (see Table 5-8). Further, salary per FTE, an 
indicator of input - environmental causes of decline, was 
negatively related to occupancy (See Table 5-8). These 
results lend support to the notion that the hospitals were 
not malleable, and their attempts to change were not 
realized. As a result, the environment determined the 
subsequent performance of the organizations. However,
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this study's conclusions regarding the impact of 
environmental determinism must be viewed with extreme 
caution. The findings were not robust across all measures 
of performance (i.e., financial, operating, and 
effectiveness) and were not consistent across all the 
causes of decline. Notably, the relationship between 
salary per FTE (the indicator of input - environmental 
causes of decline) and subsequent performance was found 
only for occupancy. Further, no relationship between 
market share (the indicator of output-environmental causes 
of decline) and performance was found.
In examining turnaround, future research could 
integrate ecological theories (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) 
with strategic choice theories (Child, 1972) to better 
explain an organization's ability to restore its 
performance. Turnaround studies have not accounted for 
population effects into their design (McKelvey, 1988). 
Investigating organizational phenomena at multiple levels 
of analysis could enhance understanding of the phenomena 
(Rousseau, 1985) . Thus, our understanding of 
organizational decline and turnaround could be enhanced by 
undertaking a multi-level investigation. For example, 
population/industry environments vary in their coercive 
forces and organizations vary in their adaptability due to 
differences in the impediments to adaptation (McKelvey,
1988). Hence, it seems that the tightness of the coupling
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between strategy and turnaround performance would be 
influenced by the interaction between the strength of the 
coercive forces in the environment and the barriers to 
adaption within organizations. The choice of strategy 
would be important for adaptable organizations in 
environments with weak coercive forces. In contrast, the 
choice of strategy may be unimportant for unadaptable 
organizations in environments with strongly coercive 
forces; these organizations likely would be selected out.
A second alternative explanation to the lack of 
support for the hypotheses is that the interactions 
between strategy content and strategy process, and 
strategy content and cause of decline are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for performance. When managers 
match their strategy process to strategy content and their 
strategy content with the cause of decline, it may become 
possible to enhance organizational performance. However, 
the realized performance may depend on additional 
contingency variables that were not examined in this 
study. For example, the efficacy of strategies depends on 
the availability of resources to support that strategy 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Thus, resources may be an important 
contingency variable. This study's results provide modest 
support for the importance of an organization's resources. 
Two hospital characteristics, both of which could 
indicate a hospital's resources, impacted subsequent
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performance; hospital size (a possible indicator of 
resources) and outpatient service mix (an indicator of 
capabilities) during decline impacted subsequent 
performance (see Tables 5-4 and 5-7).
One resource-related issue that has received some 
attention in the turnaround research stream is 
retrenchment (i.e., the liquidation and divestment of 
assets to improve the organization's cash position -- 
Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Recent research has indicated 
that the generation of positive cash balances through 
retrenchment is a key to restoring an organization's 
performance to satisfactory levels (Pearce & Robbins,
1994; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Indeed, Pearce and Robbins 
(1994) maintain that retrenchment is the foundation for 
all turnarounds. However, other recent research (Barker & 
Mone, 1994) has disagreed on the utility of retrenchment 
in all situations, and suggested that the utility of 
retrenchment may be dependent upon the cause of a firm's 
decline.
An alternative determinant of the utility of 
retrenchment may be disparity between a declining firm's 
resource portfolio and the resources necessary to support 
a given turnaround strategy. In general, an 
organization's resources suggest an optimal strategy 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). However, an organization is not 
completely constrained by their present resources; some of
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the resources used to support an organization's strategy 
may be purchased (Barney, 1986). Thus, retrenchment may 
be useful when an organization lacks the specific 
resources relevant to a new strategy and the cash 
generated from retrenchment is used to procure the 
relevant resources. In situations where the organization 
has the relevant resources, retrenchment may serve no 
useful purpose.
Third, the lack of significant results may suggest 
that turnaround processes are highly idiosyncratic to each 
hospital and, thus, not generalizable. For example, the 
respondent at Daytona Medical Center indicated that 
his/her hospital's decline was attributable to a boycott 
of the hospital by admitting physicians. Part of this 
hospital's turnaround strategy involved mending 
relationships with area physicians, which is a political 
strategy instead of the competitive strategies examined in 
this study. Political strategies include a focus on 
collective strategies (i.e., strategies of cooperation 
instead of competition -- Astley, 1984). Although past 
turnaround research has focused on competitive strategies 
(e.g., Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Robbins & 
Pearce, 1992; Schendel, Patton & Riggs, 1976), the future 
of this research stream may lie in the examination of 
collective strategies. Organizations do not act as closed 
systems (Katz & Kahn, 1966); thus, understanding a
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declining organization's interactions with its environment 
may yield important insights into an organization's 
ability to restore its performance. By identifying the 
stakeholders of an organization (Freeman, 1984), future 
research could identify the important constituencies of 
declining firms (e.g., suppliers of financial capital -- 
D'Aveni, 1989; customers and employees -- Hardy, 1987; 
regulators -- Birnbaum, 1985). Once identified, the 
impact of strategies geared toward garnering the support 
of these external constituencies could be assessed.
A final possible explanation of the results is that 
the concept of fit was theorized and modeled incorrectly. 
There are differing theoretical conceptions and 
statistical tests of fit commonly used in strategy 
research (Venkatraman, 1989). This study's theoretical 
basis is strategic choice (Child, 1972) ; accordingly, fit 
was theorized to be a bivariate interaction between 
variables. The bivariate relationships were assumed to 
be linear; however, the relationships may be curvilinear.
To assess the possibility that the relationships between 
performance and strategy content and process variables 
were curvilinear rather than linear, the strategy content 
and process variables were squared and used in regression 
equations (Hair et al., 1992). The regression equations 
were nonsignificant across the performance measures.
Thus, the post-hoc analyses showed no support for the
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notion that the relationships between strategy content and 
performance, and strategy process and performance are 
curvilinear.
Bivariate relationships often are under specified 
(Miller, 1981). Hence, the relationship among strategy 
content and process, and performance may be viewed best in 
multivariate terms. For example, the configurational 
perspective of fit groups organizations simultaneously 
along several important organizational dimensions (Miller 
& Mintzberg, 19 84). Because configurations are comprised 
of firms with similar combinations of important 
organizational variables, sets of inter-relationships can 
be holistically linked to performance (Ketchen, Thomas Sc 
Snow, 1993). Therefore, holistic combinations of strategy 
content and strategy process factors may impact subsequent 
performance.
Post-hoc analysis did not support this alternative 
theoretical perspective. Following procedures outlined in 
Ketchen and Shook (199 6), the hospitals in this sample 
were clustered using the weighted change in services, 
information usage, and centralization as clustering 
variables. The stability of the clustering solution 
across clustering algorithms was poor. Further, the 
resultant clusters were uninterpretable and reflected no 
significant differences in performance.
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This section has identified four possible 
explanations for the results of this study. In addition, 
future research avenues related to the results were 
highlighted. First, strategy may not crucial to an 
organization's ability to restore its performance; 
accordingly, future research could explore the interaction 
of strategy and distinctive competencies in creating 
equifinality. Also, ecological theories and strategic 
choice theories could be integrated and tested. Second, 
the two types of fit are necessary, but not sufficient 
conditions for enhanced performance. Future research 
could explore the role of resources as an important 
contingency variable. Third, turnaround processes are too 
idiosyncratic to generalize. The roles of external 
constituencies and collective strategies in organizational 
turnaround were identified as worthy of future research. 
Finally, alternative conceptualizations and statistical 
tests of fit may be more appropriate. In the next 
section, the limitations of this study are addressed. 
Limitations
As with all studies (Thorngate, 1976), this 
dissertation had limitations that must be noted. These 
include: 1) the number of respondents per organization; 2) 
limited statistical power; 3) potential retrospective 
bias; 4) limited generalizability of results; 5) potential
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
110
survival bias; and, 6) omission of possible feedback 
loops. These limitations are discussed next.
Originally, this study's design included two 
respondents per organization. However, the turnover of 
top managers at the hospitals was much greater than 
expected. As this study progressed, it became apparent 
that obtaining multiple respondents from a sufficient 
number of organizations was not going to be possible. 
Indeed, only twelve organizations, were, in the end, 
represented by multiple respondents. Thus, the decision 
was made to proceed with one survey per organization.
Although the use of one respondent per organization 
is not unusual in strategy research (Venkatraman & Grant, 
1986) , the validity of this study may have been enhanced 
by multiple respondents per hospital. Indeed, it has been 
argued that some true substantive relationships have been 
rejected because of measurement problems (Venkatraman & 
Grant, 1986). Thus, there may have been a greater 
probability of finding support for the hypotheses if 
multiple respondents had been available.
The small sample size (N=66) limited statistical 
power in this study. When testing the hypotheses, the 
maximum power obtained was . 19 at the . 05 level of 
significance (Cohen, 1977). Thus, the results should be 
viewed as conservative tests of these hypotheses. When 
this study was proposed, it was anticipated that the
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sample size would approximate 110; thus, this study would 
have an 80 percent probability of detecting a medium 
effect (change in R' = .15) at the .05 level of 
significance. Two factors account for the smaller-than- 
expected sample size: l) the turnover of top-level 
managers; and 2) the anticipated level of organizational 
support from Columbia/HCA did not materialize. It is 
reasonable to assume the high level of turnover had a 
dampening effect on the number of responses received. The 
second factor that reduced the anticipated sample size was 
the level of organizational support. Originally, an 
executive at Columbia/HCA had agreed to: 1) send out 
letters encouraging managers to respond to the survey; 
and, 2) follow up with non-respondents by telephone. 
Although, the executive did send out the letters, the 
personal follow-up did not materialize.
Another limitation is the possible presence of 
retrospective errors (i.e., misreporting the past -- 
Golden, 1992). Ideally, the variables measured by survey 
would be measured with objective data, and the presence of 
retrospective errors assessed. However, this was not 
possible because valid alternative methods of measuring 
the strategy process variables and the effectiveness 
performance variable were not available. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, efforts were made to reduce 
retrospective errors. These efforts included: 1)
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designing the survey to ask about specific facts or 
behaviors; 2) attempting to motivate managers to provide 
accurate information; and, 3) including a financial 
summary to focus the thoughts of the respondents on the 
appropriate period. Nonetheless, it is possible that 
managers may have misreported their organization's 
information usage, centralization, and effectiveness 
performance. Future turnaround research should consider 
collecting data by means that do not involve retrospective 
data collection. For example, if a sample could be 
identified early in the stages of decline, data could be 
collected at intervals of time such as the onset, points 
during the decline and response, and when turnaround is 
achieved. However, such a research design would take a 
major commitment of resources.
This study restricted the sample to a single industry 
to ensure that industry-level effects on firm-level 
performance were not confused with the performance effects 
of interest (Dess, Ireland & Hitt, 1990). However, the 
control over industry-level effects came at the cost of 
generalizability across industries. It is possible that 
these hypotheses would have been supported in other 
settings. For example, the hypotheses may have been 
supported in an industry where the influence of its 
external constituents is significantly less. Industries 
vary regarding the influence of external constituents
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(Hirsch, 1975), and highly regulated industries are 
subject to great influence by external constituencies 
(Bimbaum, 1985) . The hospital industry is highly 
regulated and largely influenced by third-party payers 
(Schulz & Johnson, 1983); thus, political strategies may 
be more important than competitive strategies in the 
hospital industry. In other industries, where the 
external constituencies are less influential (e.g., 
traditional manufacturing industries), competitive 
strategies may have more influence on performance; 
accordingly, the hypotheses may have been supported in 
alternative settings.
Additionally, the strategy content/cause of decline 
fit hypotheses may have been supported in industries 
outside the service sector of the economy. Although the 
causes of decline were categorized differently, support 
for matching strategy content to the cause of decline was 
found in the textile manufacturing industry (Robbins & 
Pearce, 1992). Support for the hypotheses predicting 
positive performance implications of achieving strategy 
content/cause of decline fit may have been supported in 
the manufacturing sector, because organizations in this 
sector may have clearer organizational boundaries. For 
example, in the manufacturing sector, the customers 
interface with the organization as part of the output 
environment. In contrast, the boundaries of the
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organization are less distinct in the service industry.
In the hospital industry, patients interface with the 
organization as a customer in the output environment, and 
can be considered a raw material (i.e., an input) upon 
admission and a "finished" product (i.e., and output) upon 
discharge (Schulz & Johnson, 1983). Thus, future research 
on the role of strategy content/cause of decline fit 
should be pursued in other research settings.
All firms in the sample were still operational at the 
end of the focal period. Thus, some hospitals may have 
attained a fit between strategy process and content, or a 
fit between strategy and cause of decline but still failed 
(e.g., were closed, or merged with another hospital).
Thus, had it been possible, including these failed firms 
may have influenced the results of this study. Additional 
research is needed to assess the extent of survival bias 
in turnaround literature. One design that could 
accomplish this task is a longitudinal design where data 
is collected at intervals. By collecting data in 
intervals, data could be collected from firms before they 
fail and the opportunity to collect data from them is 
missed.
Finally, the model tested in this study ignores the 
possibility of feedback loops; however, potentially 
confounding feedback loops may exist. Strategy process 
and content have important implications for performance
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(Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Huff & Reger, 1987; Li, 1995; 
Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991) ; nonetheless, performance also 
has important implications for subsequent strategy content 
and process (Milliken & Lant, 1991). This study tested 
the strategy content and process to performance linkage, 
but did not assess the impact of past performance on 
current strategy process and content. Current strategy 
process and content may have been constrained by past 
performance (Cameron, Whetten & Kim, 1987; Staw,
Sandelands & Dutton, 1981); thus, past performance may 
have discouraged high levels of information usage, 
decentralized decision making, or the use of efficiency or 
entrepreneurial strategies. The potential feedback loops 
demonstrate that performance and strategy process and 
content are temporally intertwined. Thus, future research 
should involve longitudinal designs that would allow for 
the detangling of these relationships.
Future Research
At appropriate spots throughout the discussion of the 
results and limitations of this study, implications for 
future research have been noted. Nonetheless, there are 
other future research opportunities. These opportunities 
are discussed in terms of organizational resources, 
strategy process issues, and methodological issues.
Earlier in this chapter it was suggested that future 
turnaround research could be enhanced by examining the
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resources of the declining organizations. Specifically 
the role of core competencies in organizational turnaround 
and the role of retrenchment in obtaining the appropriate 
supporting resources have been identified as opportunities 
for research. However, an organization's resources 
include anything that can be thought of as a strength or 
weakness of an organization (Wernerfelt, 1984); indeed, 
resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational 
processes, firm attributes, information, and knowledge 
controlled by an organization (Barney, 1991). Thus, the 
implications of resources on an organization's ability to 
turn its performance around may be quite broad. To date, 
top management groups are the only resource that has 
received some attention (e.g., Bibeault, 1982; Hofer,
1980; O'Neill, 1986a). Hence, other resources, such as 
culture, seem ripe for investigation. For example, 
researchers could investigate how an organization's 
identity (the way an organization's members see it -- 
Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) influences a declining 
organization's interpretation of its declining performance 
and its subsequent actions. Indeed, organizational 
identity may offer reconciliation between two competing 
perspectives on the actions of declining organizations. 
Prospect theory predicts that organizations will choose 
risky actions in response to poor performance (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979, 1982) ; in contrast, the threat-rigidity
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thesis predicts organizations will choose conservative 
actions (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981) . Thus, these 
two perspectives predict opposite reactions to the same 
strategic issue. Because organizational identity shapes 
issue interpretation and influences subsequent actions 
(Dutton Sc Dukerich, 1991; Fiol, 1991) , divergent 
organizational identities may partly explain why some 
organizations act riskily, as prospect theory would 
predict, or conservatively as the threat-rigidity thesis 
would suggest. Organizations who see themselves as risk- 
takers may interpret poor performance as an opportunity 
and take risky actions that are consistent with their 
identities. In contrast, organizations who see themselves 
as conservative may view poor performance as a threat and 
act in conservative ways that are consistent with their 
identities.
The role of organizational identity in organizational 
turnaround may prove to be quite important. A declining 
organization's identity was developed in the past (Dutton 
& Dukerich, 1991); hence, its present interpretations of, 
and actions in response to, strategic issues are deeply 
rooted in the past (Milliken & Lant, 1991) . However, 
changing times may require different interpretations and 
actions (Zimmerman, 19 86). Thus, the challenge for 
declining organizations may be doing things that are "out 
of character. "
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Although the strategy process variables examined in 
this study did not appear to be determinants of 
organizational performance, there are other strategy 
process issues that could be examined. For example, 
conflict among decision makers tends to increase in 
declining organizations (Cameron, Whetten & Kim, 1987). 
Recent research has found that there are two types of 
conflict: 1)affective, which is conflict based on 
personality issues and is dysfunctional; and, 2) 
cognitive, which is based on disagreement about ideas and 
is functional (Amason, 199 6) . Future research could 
examine the impact of both types of conflict on 
organizational decline and turnaround. Cognitive and 
affective conflict are significantly correlated in non­
declining organizations (Amason, 1996). If this 
relationship holds for declining organizations, managers 
must walk a tightrope balancing the benefits of 
encouraging open discussion about ways to address the 
decline against the tendency of these open discussions to 
turn into personality conflicts.
Another strategy process issue worthy of attention is 
interpretation of the environment. Divergence between 
obj ective and perceptual measures of the environment is 
more prevalent for low-performing firms than for high- 
performing firms (Boyd, Dess & Rasheed, 1993). Hence, it 
would appear that there is a relationship between poor
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performance and inaccuracy in interpretation of 
environments. Accurate interpretation of the environment 
is key to an organization's success (Boyd, Dess & Rasheed, 
1993), thus inaccurate interpretation may cause low 
performance. However, low performance may also cause 
inaccurate interpretation. Because low performance is not 
self-enhancing, organizational decision makers may ignore 
it and instead look for environmental factors that confirm 
their understanding of the environment (Kiesler & Sproull, 
19 82) . Hence, it would appear the relationship between 
accurate interpretation of the environment and low 
performance may be cyclical; inaccurate perceptions of the 
environment promote poor performance, and poor performance 
promotes inaccurate perceptions of the environment. If 
this relationship is indeed cyclical, research might focus 
on how decision makers can break the downward cycle.
Finally, the conceptualization and measurement of 
turnaround performance deserves future research attention. 
Performance is a key construct in the discipline (Meyer, 
1991), and especially in turnaround studies (Venkatraman & 
Prescott, 1986) . Although most turnaround studies have 
focused solely on financial outcomes (Hoffman, 1989) , this 
study measured all three types of performance (financial, 
operational, and effectiveness -- Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 
1986) . However, as shown in Table 5-3, the correlations 
between the effectiveness and the operational and
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financial measures of performance are extremely low. The 
reasons for divergence between these measures of 
performance are unknown. However, divergence of these 
measures should be viewed as an opportunity; lack of 
convergence should spur efforts at reconciliation, and can 
be an opportunity for enhancing our understanding of a 
phenomenon (Jick, 1979).
Reconciliation of the measures could follow two 
paths; one is methodological, and the other is conceptual 
(Venkatraman & Prescott, 1986). Along the methodological 
path, perhaps the financial and operational measures 
should have been measured with a different time frame, or 
the effectiveness outcomes may have been subject to 
retrospective errors (Golden, 1992) . The implications of 
this path are rather mild; as researchers, we may need to 
refine our methods for measuring turnaround performance.
Alternatively, the explanation may lay along 
conceptual paths. Perhaps practitioners and researchers 
conceptualize and assess performance differently. In 
contrast to the relatively mild implications of the 
methodological path, the research implications of this 
path go to the very heart of this research stream. 
Performance is a construct that is central to this 
research stream. Thus, it is critical that researchers 
understand the nature of this construct. One of the 
discipline's tenets is that research should have ultimate
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application to the problems of managers (Montgomery, 
Wernerfelt & Balakrishnan, 1989). The discipline has 
nothing to tell practitioners about how to improve their 
organization's performance until it determines that 
researchers and managers are talking about the same issue 
in the same language.
Conclusion
This study sought to illustrate the importance of 
achieving two types of fit to restoring declining 
performance. The two types of fit were: 1) fit between 
strategy content and strategy process; and, 2) fit between 
strategy and cause of decline.
Past research has shown that fit between strategy 
content and process leads to higher performance (Ketchen, 
Thomas & McDaniel, 1996; Miles, Snow, Meyer & Coleman,
1978) . Thus, this study posited that organizations that 
matched their strategy with the appropriate level of 
centralization of decision making and information usage 
would experience positive performance.
Past research has also demonstrated that fit between 
the recovery strategy and cause of decline leads to higher 
performance (Robbins & Pearce, 1992). However, extant 
research examined inductively-derived causes of decline. 
This study theoretically derived the cause of decline from 
the open-systems paradigm (Katz & Kahn, 1966), and posited
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an organization's performance would be enhanced by 
matching their strategy with the causes of decline.
Strategy content and process, cause of decline, and 
performance data from 1987 to 1994 were collected for 66 
hospitals. Moderated multiple regression failed to 
support the positive performance implications of either 
type of fit. Various potential explanations for the lack 
of support for the positive performance implications of 
fit were offered. These explanations included: 1) the 
choice of strategy is not crucial to turnaround 
performance; 2) the two types of fit are necessary but not 
sufficient for enhanced performance; 3) turnaround 
processes are too idiosyncratic to generalize; and 4) a 
conceptualization of fit other than the one posited in 
this study may be more appropriate.
As with all studies, this study suffered from some 
limitations. These limitations included, the number of 
respondents per organization, limited statistical power, 
limited generalizability of the results, potential 
retrospective and survival biases, and untested feedback 
loops.
Although this study's hypotheses were not supported, 
there are many related issues to be researched. These 
include the roles of the environment, organizational 
resources, and other strategy processes in organizational 
turnaround. Further, the discrepancy between archival and
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perceptual measures of performance noted in this study, 
illustrates the need for researchers to better understand 
the dependent variable in turnaround studies.
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APPENDIX A: COVER LETTER
February 20, 1996
Mr. John Smithhisler 
Chief Executive Officer 
Sunbelt Regional Medical Center 
13111 East Freeway 
Houston, TX 77015
Dear Mr. Smithhisler:
As a result of changes in the hospital industry over the last decade an 
increasing number of hospitals have experienced financial challenges.
However, to date, the topic of how hospitals respond to financial challenges 
has not been studied adequately.
Your hospital is one of a small number in which managers are being asked 
to describe both their hospital's response to financial challenges and the 
manner in which that response was developed and implemented. This survey will 
be used to develop recoamendations for improving hospital performance, but 
will not be used for consulting activities. In order that the results truly 
represent the actions of hospitals that have faced financial challenges, each 
questionnaire should be completed and returned. The questionnaire should take 
approximately 15 minutes to complete. It is important that the questionnaires 
be completed by two managers who have been at the hospital since 1990. Thus, 
please have the two highest-level managers (including yourself, if applicable) 
that have been at the hospital since 1990 complete this questionnaire.
You and the other respondent (s) may be assured of confidentiality. The 
questionnaire has an identification number for mailing purposes only. This is
so chat we may check the hospital's name off of Che mailing list when the
questionnaires are returned.
If you are one of the respondents, you may receive a summary of the 
results by writing "copy of results requested* on the back of the return 
envelope, and printing your name and address b-’low it. Please do not put this
information on the questionnaire icself. If you are not one of the
•respondents, then you may receive a summary of the results by writing me.
I would be most happy to answer any questions you might have. Please 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE
A STUDY OF HOW HOSPITALS RESPOND 
TO FINANCIAL CHALLENGES
Overview
This survey is designed to investigate how 
hospitals respond to financial challenges. The goal 
of this research is to better understand how 
hospitals react to changes in financial performance 
and develop recommendations for hospitals facing 
financial challenges.
Answering this survey doesn’t involve research 
on your part and will take approximately fifteen 
minutes. Your timely response to this survey is 
important to the success of this effort.
College of Business 
Department of Management 
Louisiana State University 
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A Study of How Hospitals Respond 
to Financial Challenges
This study examines the responses of hospitals to financial challenges. It seeks to (11 identify the types 
of strategies hospitals used in an attem pt to improve performance, and (21 gain an understanding of factors 
influencing strategic decisions. To gain a better understanding of the factors influencing strategic 
decisions you will be asked questions about: (II the nature o f your hospital's response: (21 the m anner in 
which your hospital's response w as developed and im plem ented; (3) the reason for recent financial 
challenges; and. (4) the characteristics of your hospital.
This survey is being used for purposes of research only and  individual survey responses will be strictly 
confidential. The identification number on the survey is only used  for mailing purposes. Summary results 
of this study  wilt be m ade available to those participants w ho desire them.
This survey  u ses the term  "financial challenges* to refer to  the  performance indicated by the low or 
negative return on assets ratio. A financial summary of the y ears 1988-1994 has been included below for 
your reference. This sum m ary w as  derived from your M edicare Cost Reports and w as obtained from the 
Center for Healthcare Industry Performance Studies. Please tak e  a  moment to review this sum m ary before 
completing th is survey.
Your cooperation is sincerely appreciated.
450126
Sun Belt Regional Medical Center
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d en o tes missing data
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I) THE NATURE OF YOUR HOSPITAL'S RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CHALLENGES
Q1. To wha( ex ten t did your hospital respond  to the financial challenges (i.e.. low or negative return 
on assets) by ....
(circle your answ er)
1. developing n ew  patien t bases?
2. introducing innovative medical serv ices?
3. expanding th e  range of medical se rv ices offered?
4. acquiring n e w  medical technology to  a ttrac t patients?
5. serving existing patien t bases m ore efficiently?
6. offering existing m edical services m ore efficiently?
7. limiting th e  range  of services offered?
To a: Small 
Extent 














II) HOW  THE HOSPITAL'S RESPONSE WAS DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED
0 2 . W hen developing and implementing your organization's response to the financial challenges, to 
w hat extent:
(circle your answer)
To a: Small G reat
Extent Extent
1. did one or tw o  top hospital m anagers dom inate decision making? 1 2 3 4 5
2. did all m em bers o f th e  hospital's top  m anagem ent make strategic
decisions on  a regular basis? 1 2 3 4 5
3. w as authority  for making strategic decisions shared by all
top  m anagers? 1 2 3 4 5
4. did execu tives at the  hospital's corpora te  parent make
strategic decisions for your hospital? N/A 1 2 3 4 5
5. did all top m anagers share responsibility for strategic decisions? 1 2 3 4 5
6. could decision making authority be characterized as shared among
all top m anagers? 1 2 3 4 5
7. w as stra teg ic  decision making characterized  by the "push and pull*
of different in te res ts  (e.g., adm inistrators, physicians)? 1 2 3 4 5
8. w as conflict an  accep ted  outcom e o f stra teg ic  decision making? 1 2 3 4 5
9. could s tra teg ic  decision making in your hospital be characterized
as bargaining, negotiating, and com prom ising? 1 2 3 4 5
10. did coalitions am ong top  m anagers change  over different strategic
issues? 1 2 3 4 5
11. w as there a system atic  search for inform ation during strategic
decision making? 1 2 3 4 5
12. w as anger am ong top m anagers w ith  each  other evident? 1 2 3 4 5
13. w as there personal friction among group members? 1 2 3 4 5
14. were personality  d a s h e s  among group m em bers evident? 1 2 3 4 5
15. w as tension  within th e  group evident? 1 2 3 4 5
16. were there d isagreem ents over different ideas about how to improve
perform ance? 1 2 3 4 5
17. were there m any differences of opinion about how to address the
finandal challenges? 1 2 3 .4 5
18. did top m anagers have to work through  m any differences regarding
the hosp ita l's  stra tegy? 1 2 3 4 5
2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4 4
□ 3. W hen developing and im plem enting your resp o n se  to  the financial challenges, to w ha t ex ten t 
did you use the following sources o f inform ation?
(circle your answ er)




1. internal financial reports 1 2 3 4 5
2. internal operating rep o n s 1 2 3 4 5
3. discussions am ong top m anagers 1 2 3 4 5
4. discussions among o ther em ployees 1 2 3 4 5
5 . other sources internal to  the hosp ital 1 2 3 4 5
6 . new spaper articles 1 2 3 4 5
7. healthcare journals 1 2 3 4 5
8 . governm ent sta tistics 1 2 3 4 5
9. cham ber of com m erce s ta tistics 1 2 3 4 5
10. marketing surveys 1 2 3 4 5
11. discussions with industry ex p erts 1 2 3 4 5
12. discussions with consultants 1 2 3 4 5
13. m anaged care vendors 1 2 3 4 5
14. o ther hospitals ow ned by the  s a m e  m ulti-hospital system  N/A 1 2 3 4 5
15.
Q4.
o ther sources external to  the  h osp ita l 1 2  3 4 
Durina the hoso ital's oerform ance decline, ho w  im oonant were each of the following
5
perform ance com parisons in form ulating your s tra teg ic  response?
Comparison with ...
1. your hospital's past perform ance
2. short-term  perform ance asp irations of the  hospital
3 . long-term perform ance aspirations o f th e  hospital
4 . hospitals in your multi-hospital sy s te m
5. average perform ance in the  in d u stry  nationwide
6 . hospitals located in your com m unity
7. hospitals th a t com pete in a w ay  sim ilar to you
8 . hospitals experiencing similar perform ance to  yours






Looking beyond the health care industry , how  im portant w ere comparisons with...
9 . firms in o ther service industries w ith in  your com m unity 1 2 3 4 5
10. local service firms experiencing sim ilar perform ance to  yours 1 2 3 4 5
11. highly reputable organizations desc rib ed  in th e  m edia 1 2 3 4 5
12. firms m anaged by people you k n o w  socially or professionally 1 2 3 4 5
For each of the pairs below , please divide 100  points am ong the following according to h nv 
im portant they w ere as com parators in evaluating your hospital's performance?
1. a . your hospital's p a s t perform ance_______________________________________
b. your hospital's long-term perfo rm ance  aspirations ____
100
2. a. your hospital's p a s t perform ance 
b. the perform ance of other h osp ita ls
100
3. a. the perform ance of o ther hosp itals
b. the perform ance of firms o u ts id e  the  health care industry
100
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Q5. A t th e  p re sen t tim e, how im portant a rc  each  of th e  following comparisons when evaluating 
w hether o r no t your hospital's perform ance is at an  acceptable level?
(circle your answer! 
Very Very
Unimportant Important
Com parison w ith ...
t . y o u r hosp ita l's  past performance 1 2 3 4 5
2. short-term  performance aspirations of th e  hospital 1 2 3 4 5
3. long-term  perform ance aspirations of th e  hospital 1 2 3 4 5
4. h o sp ita ls in your multi-hospital system N/A 1 2 3 4 5
5. av erage  perform ance in th e  industry nationw ide 1 2 3 4 5
6. h osp ita ls located in your comm unity I 2 3 4 5
7. h osp ita ls th a t compete in a w ay similar to  you 1 2 3 4 5
8. h osp ita ls experiencing similar perform ance to yours 1 2 3 4 5
Looking beyond  th e  health care industry, h o w  im portant are com parisons with..
9 . firm s in o th er service industries within your com m unity 1 2 3 4 5
10. local service firms experiencing similar perform ance to yours 1 2 3 4  • 5
11. highly reputable organizations described  in th e  media 1 2 3 4 5
12. firm s m anaged by people you know  socially o r professionally 1 2 3 4 5
For each  o f th e  pairs below, please divide 1 0 0  points am ong the  following according to how  
im portant they  are. a t present, a s  com parato rs in evaluating your hospital's performance?
1. a. y o u r hosp ita l's  past perform ance ____
b. your hosp ita l's  long-term perform ance aspirations ____
100
2. a. your h osp ita l's  past perform ance 
b. th e  perform ance of other hospitals
3. a. th e  perform ance of other hospitals ____
b. th e  perform ance of firms outside the  health  care industry ____
100
III) THE CAUSE OF THE HOSPITAL'S FINANCIAL CHALLENGES
Q6 P lease consider the cause(s) of the  financial challenges. Rate these  factors from 1 to 5 in such 
i  fashion as to  indicate the  causation of the  hosp ital's financial challenges. (1 extremely 
un im portan t. 5-extrcmely important)
  C o st o r availability of resources (e .g .. s ta ff, supplies, etc.)
Internal p rocesses and operations (e .g ., inefficiency, quality problems)
D em and for services offered (e.g ., low  dem and for services, new  competitors in community, 
e tc .)
R educed reimbursement ra tes
Increased m arket penetration of m anaged  care activities
4
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Q7. To w h a t ex ten t w ere the following factors associated  w ith  the hospital's financial challenges 
(i.e. low  or negative net income)?
(circle your answer!
1. high labor c o s ts
To a: Small 
Extent 




2. s c a rc e  supply of admitting doctors 1 2 3 4 5
3. high p rice s  of supplies 1 2 3 4 5
4. sc a rc e  supply  of nurses 1 2 3 4 5
5. m isd irec ted  grow th 1 2 3 4 5
6. inefficient operations 1 2 3 4 5
7. in ad eq u ate  c o s t controls 1 2 3 4 5
8. in ad eq u ate  quality controls 1 2 3 4 5
9. m erger of com petitors 1 2 3 4 5
10. co m p e tito rs ' new  service offerings 1 2 3 4 5
11. new  co m p e tito rs  in the community 1 2 3 4 5
11. ch an g ed  com m unity demographics (e.g.. aging population) 1 2 3 4 5
12. low  d em an d  for service offerings 1 2 3 , 4 5
13. in crease  in unreim bursed services 1 2 3 4 5
VI) YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE HOSPITAL'S SUBSEQUENT PERFORMANCE 
Q8. In gen era l, how  would you rate ...
(circle your answer) 
Very Very
Poor Good
1. the e ffec tiv en ess  of your hospital's response to  the  financial decline? 1 2 3 4 5
2. the  c u rre n t perform ance of your hospital? 1 2 3 4 5
VIII) OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
Q9. P lease  circle th e  word which best describes your hospital:
ACUTE SPECIALTY TERTIARY
Q 10. W hat year did your hospital join Columbia/HCA Healthcare C orpora tion?_______
Q 1 1. W hat year w as your hospital fo u n d ed ?_______
Q 12. H ow  m any  years have you been at this hospital?_________________________
Q 13. W hat is your title/position?___________________________________________
Q 14. W h at year w ere  you b o m ? ________
Q 15. How m any years of experience do you have in the healthcare in d u stry ?____
Q 16. P lease  circle th e  word(s) which best describes your expertise:
ACCOUNTING/FINANCE MARKETING OPERATIONS/MANAGEMENT CLINICAL
Is th e re  anything else you would like to tell u s  about how your hospital responded to the 
financial challenges?  If so . please use  the back of this page for this purpose. Any com m ents you 
wish to m ak e  th a t you think may help us in future efforts to understand  how hospitals respond to 
financial ch allenges will be appreciated. Your contribution to th is effort is very greatly appreciated.
5
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APPENDIX C: REMINDER POSTCARD
February 26 , 1996
Last week a questionnaire asking how  your hospital responded to 
financial challenges w as sent to you.
If your hospital has already completed and returned it to us today, please 
accept our sincere thanks. If not, please do so today. Because it has 
been sent to only a small sample of hospitals, it is extrem ely important 
that yours also be included in the study if the results are to accurately 
represent hospitals that have faced financial challenges.
If by som e chance you did not receive the questionnaire, or it got 
misplaced, please call me right now (5 0 4 -3 8 8 -6 2 1 2 ), and I will get 
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APPENDIX D: COVER LETTER FOR SECOND MAILING
March 11, 1996
Mr. John Smithhisler 
Chief Executive Officer 
Sunbelt Regional Medical Center 
13111 East Freeway 
Houston, TX 77015
Dear Mr. Smithhisler:
I need your help! About three weeks ago I wrote to you asking 
how your hospital had responded to financial challenges. As of 
today, your completed questionnaires have not been received.
Your hospital's response is vital to the success of this research 
project and, on a personal note, to the completion of my 
dissertation and my doctorate in management.
I am writing to you again because of the significance each 
questionnaire has to the usefulness of this study. Your hospital 
was selected through a sampling process in which only one in 
forty two hospitals are being asked to describe their hospital's 
response to financial challenges. In order chat the results 
truly represent the actions of hospitals chat have faced 
financial challenges, each hospital in the sample needs to 
respond. As mentioned in the last letter, the questionnaires 
should be completed by managers who have been at the hospital 
since 1990. Thus, please have the two highest-level managers 
(including yourself, if applicable) that have been at the 
hospital since 1990 complete this questionnaire.
In the event that your questionnaires have been misplaced, 
replacements are enclosed.




P.S. A number of people have written to ask when results of this 
study will be available. I hope to have them out in May.
148
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APPENDIX E: FAX COVER SHEET FOR THIRD ITERATION
D epartm ent of M anagem ent 
College of Business Adm inistration 
Louisiana S tate  University 
Baton Rouge. LA 708 0 3 -6 3 1 2
Facsimile C orrespondence A pril___ . 1996
To: Mr. S tep h en  Royal. President and CEO 
Spring Branch M edical C enter 45 0 6 3 0  
Fax#: (713) 7 2 2 -3 7 8 0
From: Chris Shook - Project Director 
Fax ff: (504) 388-6140  
Tele ff : (504) 388 -6212
Num ber of P ages: 7  (including this cover sheet)
M essage :
I am con tac ting  you abou t my study of how  hospitals respond to financial challenges. 
I have no t yet received a your com pleted questionnaire.
This is the first s tu d y  of this type th a t has ever b een  done. Therefore, the results are 
of particular im portance to  many hospital executives. H ow ever, the usefulness of the 
results depend  on how  accurately I am able to describe how  hospitals responded to 
financial challenges. P ast experience suggests th a t tho se  hospitals which have not 
ye t responded  m ay have acted quite differently th an  th o se  which have. Thus, your 
input is critical to  the su ccess  of this study, and, on a personal note, to the completion 
of my doctoral d issertation .
It is for th e se  reaso n s th a t I am sending this by facsimile. In case my other 
correspondence  did no t reach you, a replacem ent questionnaire is also being sent. 
May I urge you to have a m anager tha t has been there  since 1990 take fifteen minutes 
to com plete it today  and fax it back to me at (504) 388 -6140?
Your contribution to the  su ccess  of this study will be appreciated  greatly.
Confidentiality Notice
This facsimile transmission and the documents accoopanying it cay contain wort product and/or privileged and 
confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above, tf the reader of 
this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copy 
of this telecopy is strictly prohibited. If you have received this telecopy in error, please iamcdiately notify 
us by telephone and return the original message to us at the above via the United States Postal Service. Thank 
you.
149
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APPENDIX F: COVER LETTER FOR FOURTH MAILING
1 * 0  t t m
i o t n t t t l U - .  K v h i i h L *  | l l * |  7





Chief Executive Officer 
Sunbelt Regional Medical Center 
13111 East Freeway 
Houston, TX 77015
Dear Mr. Smithhisler
Researchers at Louisiana State University have undertaken a research project to 
better understand how hospitals respond to financial challenges. The goal of 
this research is to construct a model of strategic responses to declining financial 
performance and develop recommendations for hospitals facing financial 
challenges. As you may know, your hospital was included in the sample and 
mailed a survey a few weeks ago, but your completed survey has not been 
received.
As Chief Executive Officer at Audubon Regional Medical Center, I know that 
there are many demands on your time. However, may I ask a favor? If you 
have been at this hospital since 1990, please take the dollar bill attached to the 
enclosed survey and go buy yourself a coke to drink while taking a few minutes 
to complete the enclosed questionnaire. If you haven't been there since 1990, 
please pass it along to one of your managers who has and ask them to complete 
it. When finished, return the survey in the enclosed postage-paid envelope.
I greatly appreciate your help.
Sincerely,
Michael L. Louviere
President and Chief Executive Officer
150
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